

Executive Summary

This audit report was prepared by Quantstamp, the leader in blockchain security.

Type	Bitcoin Bridge
Timeline	2024-04-29 through 2024-05-03
Language	Solidity
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review
Specification	RFC: OrangeKit Bitcoin Account Metaprotocol
Source Code	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> thesis/mezo-portal #0000ff5 https://github.com/keep-network/tbtc-v2 #9e047d1 https://github.com/thesis/orangekit #44355ad
Auditors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cameron Biniamow Auditing Engineer Shih-Hung Wang Auditing Engineer Rabib Islam Auditing Engineer

Documentation quality	High 
Test quality	High 
Total Findings	10 Fixed: 3 Acknowledged: 7
High severity findings ⓘ	0
Medium severity findings ⓘ	1 Fixed: 1 
Low severity findings ⓘ	2 Acknowledged: 2 
Undetermined severity findings ⓘ	0
Informational findings ⓘ	7 Fixed: 2 Acknowledged: 5 

Summary of Findings

Mezo is a project focused on developing an "economic layer" for Bitcoin. The current audit report is concerning a Points Portal where users can deposit BTC to earn points.

In order to participate in Mezo Portal, users are to deposit BTC on the Bitcoin network to an address determined by a script and its particular inputs. Following that, a process can be initiated that will result in TBTC being deposited into the `Portal` contract for a user-determined, protocol-constrained, pre-specified lock period.

During this audit, we found an issue which results in a loss of security for the ECDSA being used to validate Bitcoin signed messages that enable the use of an admin function.

Overall, the code quality was quite good. We do recommend, however, updating the test suite in order to ensure that all tests are passing.

Update: The issues have been addressed.

ID	DESCRIPTION	SEVERITY	STATUS
MEZO-1	Potential Signature Forgery Due to Lack of Validation on Public Keys	• Medium ⓘ	Fixed
MEZO-2	Late Lock Period Validation May Lead to Stuck Funds	• Low ⓘ	Acknowledged
MEZO-3	Incompatible with Deflationary and Fee-on-Transfer Tokens	• Low ⓘ	Acknowledged
MEZO-4	<code>PUSH0</code> Remains Unsupported on some Blockchains	• Informational ⓘ	Acknowledged

ID	DESCRIPTION	SEVERITY	STATUS
MEZO-5	Inconsistent Event Emission	• Informational ⓘ	Acknowledged
MEZO-6	Gas Savings	• Informational ⓘ	Acknowledged
MEZO-7	Unmasked Result of Create2 Address Calculation	• Informational ⓘ	Fixed
MEZO-8	ECDSA Signature Malleability	• Informational ⓘ	Fixed
MEZO-9	Potential Incompatibility with ERC-4337	• Informational ⓘ	Acknowledged
MEZO-10	Privileged Roles and Ownership	• Informational ⓘ	Acknowledged

Assessment Breakdown

Quantstamp's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

i Disclaimer

Only features that are contained within the repositories at the commit hashes specified on the front page of the report are within the scope of the audit and fix review. All features added in future revisions of the code are excluded from consideration in this report.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow / underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting

Methodology

1. Code review that includes the following
 1. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 2. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 3. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 1. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 2. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarity, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, and actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Scope

Files Included

Scope for `thesis/mezo-portal`

- `solidity/contracts/BitcoinDepositor.sol`
- `solidity/contracts/Portal.sol`

Scope for `keep-network/tbtc-v2`

- `solidity/contracts/integrator/AbstractTBTCDepositor.sol`

Scope for `thesis/orangekit`

- `solidity/contracts/*`

Findings

MEZO-1

Potential Signature Forgery Due to Lack of Validation on Public Keys

• Medium ⓘ

Fixed

✓ Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client.
Addressed in: 51985d2 .

A function `isOnCurve()` is now being used to determine whether a point is on the curve. Although the fix appears to be sufficient, an extra level of assurance may be provided by validating that `x` and `y` are both below `SECP256K1_P`

File(s) affected: `BitcoinSafeOwner.sol`

Description: The `validateCompressedP2PKH()` function defined in `BitcoinSafeOwner` is susceptible to a hash collision attack (specifically, a **birthday attack**), where an adversary may try to brute-force different `y` and `s` values to forge a valid signature if the `x` value for calculating the `truncatedBitcoinAddress` is known. The collision attack would reduce the bits of security level from 160 to 81 bits, making the attack practical for well-capitalized attackers. The `validateP2SH_P2WPKH()` and `validateP2WPKH()` functions have the same issue.

Ultimately, this may lead to a situation where the singleton is upgraded to a malicious contract.

Exploit Scenario: We demonstrate the details of the attack as follows. Given a known `truncatedBitcoinAddress`, derived by a compressed public key (x, y) , our goal is to find some y', v, r, s such that `ecrecover(signedMessage, v, r, s) == publicKeyToEthereumAddress(x, y')` for our chosen `signedMessage`. If so, we successfully forge a signature for `signedMessage`.

First, we randomly select 2^{80} `y'` values whose last bit is the same as `y`. We calculate `publicKeyToEthereumAddress(x, y')` for each `y'` and collect the results (which are random addresses) to a set, `A`. Since `y` and `y'` have the same last bit, the derived `truncatedBitcoinAddress` remains the same.

Next, we set `v = 27` and `r` to an arbitrary constant, e.g., `bytes32(1)`. We randomly select 2^{80} `s` values within the range of $[1, n - 1]$, where `n` is the order of the `secp256k1` group. We calculate `ecrecover(signedMessage, v, r, s)` for each `s` and collect the results (also random addresses) to another set, `B`. Note that for any `s` in the specified range, `ecrecover()` should be able to recover a signer successfully with a negligible probability of failure, following the **public key recovery process**.

We compare the two sets, `A` and `B`. If any address in set `A` is also in `B`, we successfully achieve our goal. Given that the total number of addresses is 2^{160} , since we have 2^{80} uniformly sampled addresses in both sets `A` and `B`, we may find a collision with a reasonable probability, which is about $1 - 1/e = 0.63$.

Recommendation: When validating signatures for addresses derived from a compressed public key, consider adding a check to ensure that the provided (x, y) is a valid point on the `secp256k1` curve. This would ensure the uniqueness of the `y` value for a given `truncatedBitcoinAddress`. Therefore, the above attack technique would become invalid.

MEZO-2 Late Lock Period Validation May Lead to Stuck Funds

• Low ⓘ

Acknowledged

ⓘ Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.
The client provided the following explanation:

In the BTC deposit flow, the user needs to assemble the P2WSH address and the lock period is a part of the script. This is quite a complicated action and users are not doing it manually. This happens in the dApp and is implemented in the tBTC SDK: <https://github.com/keep-network/tbtc-v2/tree/main/typescript>. In the context of the audit, we assume this code works correctly because if not, much worse things can happen like, for example, sending tBTC to some arbitrary address without the P2WSH deposit script encoded at all. If we assume the code of tBTC SDK works correctly, there is still one scenario when MEZO-2 can happen: it's when the allowed lock time range changed between the time P2WSH script was assembled and the deposit was revealed and finalized. But for this to happen, the governance must execute an update that will cause this problem. I assume that if the need for such an upgrade arises,

the governance will execute it in a responsible way, like updating the allowed range in the dApp before changing it on the contract side and making sure there are no deposits in the queue that would violate the rules.

File(s) affected: `BitcoinDepositor.sol`, `Portal.sol`

Description: In the flow for `BitcoinDepositor.finalizeDeposit()`, the function `Portal._calculateUnlockTime()` is called, and the validation at `Portal.sol#L461-467`, which checks whether `lockPeriod` is within a fixed range, may cause the transaction to revert. However, in the context of the protocol, this would be occurring after the deposit is revealed and after TBTC is already minted to the `BitcoinDepositor` contract. Moreover, there is no means implemented to recover this minted TBTC from the `BitcoinDepositor`.

Recommendation: Consider validating the `lockPeriod` in the flow for `BitcoinDepositor.initializeDeposit()` in order to avoid reversion of `finalizeDeposit()`.

MEZO-3

Incompatible with Deflationary and Fee-on-Transfer Tokens

• Low ⓘ

Acknowledged

i Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.

Addressed in: `347c04a`.

The client provided the following explanation:

We do not plan to work with deflationary or fee-on-transfer tokens. We added a warning about it and we will make it a part of our governance action checklist when adding new supported tokens.

File(s) affected: `Portal.sol`

Description: If any tokens used are deflationary or have a fee-on-transfer and do not maintain a constant supply, fewer funds than expected could be transferred into the `Portal` contract when `_depositFor()` is executed. Therefore, the `deposits` mapping would hold an inflated `token` balance for the `depositOwner`. While the deposit would execute successfully, when the `depositOwner` attempts to withdraw their tokens, there could be an insufficient token balance in the `Portal` contract to support the withdrawal.

Recommendation: Avoid using deflationary or fee-on-transfer tokens in the `Portal` contract. If fee-on-transfer tokens are desired, check the token balance of the `Portal` contract before and after the transfer to obtain the actual amount of tokens transferred. Note that for deflationary tokens, it is difficult to track each user's deposit amount accurately, and additional logic would need to be added to the `Portal` contract to support these tokens.

MEZO-4

`PUSH0` Remains Unsupported on some Blockchains

• Informational ⓘ

Acknowledged

i Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.

The client provided the following explanation:

The Mezo Portal smart contracts have the Solidity pragma fixed on version `0.8.24` and this version of the compiler is used in `hardhat.config.ts`. We do not plan to deploy the Portal contract to L2s in the near future but we will consider the `PUSH0` limitation if we decide to do so.

The OrangeKit smart contracts have the Solidity pragma fixed on version `0.8.25` and this version of the compiler is used in `hardhat.config.ts`. `PUSH0` could be a potential problem but we do not plan to deploy OrangeKit contracts to L2s in the near future. We will consider this limitation if we decide to do so.

Description: It should be noted that since Solidity version `0.8.20`, the `PUSH0` opcode is being used. However, some EVM blockchains may not support this opcode. Special care is advised given the potential changes to contract deployment code as well as the corresponding effect on contract addresses; if the same contract addresses are desired across all chains, the same compilation options should be used for every deployment.

Recommendation: Check whether the blockchains targeted for deployment support `PUSH0`. If it is desired to deploy on blockchains that do not implement `PUSH0`, it would be advised to compile with the `paris` EVM version.

MEZO-5 Inconsistent Event Emission

• Informational ⓘ

Acknowledged

i Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.
The client provided the following explanation:

Acknowledged: <https://github.com/thesis/mezo-portal/issues/811>. Since the contracts are already deployed and this issue is just informational, we will consider this change during the next potential Portal contract upgrade.

File(s) affected: Portal.sol

Description: In the `initialize()` function, an array of `supportedTokens` are added to the contract. However, unlike in `addSupportedToken()`, the event `SupportedTokenAdded` is not emitted for each new token.

Recommendation: Consider emitting the `SupportedTokenAdded` event for each token added in the `initialize()` function for consistency.

MEZO-6 Gas Savings

• Informational ⓘ Acknowledged

i Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.
The client provided the following explanation:

Acknowledged: <https://github.com/thesis/mezo-portal/issues/812>. Since the contracts are already deployed and this issue is just informational, we will consider this change during the next potential BitcoinDepositor contract upgrade.

File(s) affected: BitcoinDepositor.sol, AbstractBTCDepositor.sol

Description: Certain changes can be made to improve the gas efficiency of the contracts:
1. Use custom errors instead of `require()`.

Recommendation: Consider implementing the above recommendations.

MEZO-7 Unmasked Result of Create2 Address Calculation

• Informational ⓘ Fixed

✓ Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client.
Addressed in: 736822e .

File(s) affected: OrangeKitSafeFactory.sol

Description: The `computeAddress()` function in the `OrangeKitSafeFactory` contract is borrowed from OpenZeppelin's `Create2` contract. Note that in a recent update of `Create2`, the returned `addr` value is masked to prevent dirty upper bits from being used later in assembly code blocks. See [PR #4941](#) for more details.

Recommendation: We suggest following OpenZeppelin's latest code by updating the corresponding line to:

```
addr := and(keccak256(start, 85), 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff)
```

MEZO-8 ECDSA Signature Malleability

• Informational ⓘ Fixed

✓ Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client.
Addressed in: 84dce96 .

It is now checked whether `s` is greater than the appropriate threshold value. If it is, the transaction reverts.

File(s) affected: BitcoinSafeOwner.sol

Description: The `BitcoinSafeOwner` uses `ecrecover()` to recover the signer from a given signature. Note that `ecrecover()` allows signature malleability, where two different `s` values can be combined with the same `r` value to produce two valid signatures.

The malleability of the `s` value does not cause an issue in the current use case of recovering the signer. Still, it is best practice to avoid signature malleability to enhance the code's robustness and prevent potential issues in future iterations.

Recommendation: Consider replacing `ecrecover()` with OpenZeppelin's `recover()`, which checks the `s` value to be within a specific range and raises an error if not.

MEZO-9 Potential Incompatibility with ERC-4337

• Informational ⓘ

Acknowledged

i Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.

The client provided the following explanation:

```
The plan for achieving ERC-4337 compatibility has been outlined in
https://github.com/thesis/orangekit/pull/81.
```

The plan mentioned above consists of an RFC. However, we note that if implemented as stated, the plan may result in a roadblock due to rules in ERC-7562. We have followed up with the client.

File(s) affected: `BitcoinSafeOwner.sol`

Description: According to the given documentation "RFC: OrangeKit Bitcoin Account Metaprotocol", compatibility with ERC-4337 is one of the goals when designing the smart account.

Typically, when an ERC-4337 account validates a user operation, the signature validation logic is forwarded to the owner via the ERC-1271 flow if the owner is a contract, which is the approach implemented by the `Safe4337Module`. Therefore, the `isValidSignature()` function implemented by the owner contract has to comply with the ERC-4337 validation rules. Otherwise, the user operation could be rejected by bundlers.

Among the validation rules, the storage access rules restrict a non-entity contract to only access **account-associated storage slots** during the validation phase. If the owner contract is a proxy contract, a call to the owner would violate the storage access rule as the implementation slot is non-associated with the account. Since the owner is a `BitcoinSafeOwner` proxy, the call to `isValidSignature()` will be incompatible with the validation of ERC-4337 user operations.

A minor thing to note is that the `Safe` contract of version v1.4.1 does not support ERC-4337 by default. Instead, the `Safe4337Module` should be enabled at Safe deployment time afterward.

Recommendation: Consider how the smart account should support ERC-4337 and modify the contract to make the user operation validation flow comply with the ERC-4337 standard.

MEZO-10 Privileged Roles and Ownership

• Informational ⓘ

Acknowledged

i Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client.

The client provided the following explanation:

```
We inform our users about the custody model in our documentation: https://info.mezo.org/btc-custody-on-
mezo/deposit-custody but we will also improve it on the smart contract documentation level:
https://github.com/thesis/mezo-portal/issues/810.
```

Description: Smart contracts will often store specific addresses in order to accord them with special privileges, e.g. to make modifications to other important data.

The following are a list of functions that are only accessible to particular addresses:

- `BitcoinSafeOwner`
 - `truncatedBitcoinAddress`
 - `upgradeSingleton()`
 - `emergencyGovernance.emergencyUpgrader()`
 - `emergencyUpgradeSingleton()`
- `EmergencyGovernance`
 - `owner`
 - `disable()`
 - `setEmergencyUpgrader()`
- `OrangeKitSafeFactory`
 - `owner`

2. upgradeSingleton()
3. transferOwnership()
4. Portal
 1. owner
 2. addSupportedToken()
 3. setMinLockPeriod()
 4. setMaxLockPeriod()

Note that some of the contracts are upgradeable, including `BitcoinDepositor`, `Portal`, `BitcoinSafeOwner`, and `OrangeKitSafeFactory`. Such contracts can have their implementations changed by the owner of the proxy.

Recommendation: This centralization of power needs to be made clear to the users, especially depending on the level of privilege the contract allows to the owner.

Definitions

- **High severity** – High-severity issues usually put a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or are reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client's reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
- **Medium severity** – Medium-severity issues tend to put a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or are reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
- **Low severity** – The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
- **Informational** – The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
- **Undetermined** – The impact of the issue is uncertain.
- **Fixed** – Adjusted program implementation, requirements or constraints to eliminate the risk.
- **Mitigated** – Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the risk.
- **Acknowledged** – The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional business or design decision. As such, it is supposed to be addressed outside the programmatic means, such as: 1) comments, documentation, README, FAQ; 2) business processes; 3) analyses showing that the issue shall have no negative consequences in practice (e.g., gas analysis, deployment settings).

Appendix

File Signatures

The following are the SHA-256 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different SHA-256 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different SHA-256 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review.

Files

- c40...82d ./mezo-contracts/EmergencyGovernance.sol
- fcc...8e3 ./mezo-contracts/LegacyERC1271.sol
- 1c1...52b ./mezo-contracts/BitcoinDepositor.sol
- 96b...d80 ./mezo-contracts/Proxy.sol
- b24...b8e ./mezo-contracts/Portal.sol
- 6f4...313 ./mezo-contracts/ERC1271.sol
- bfd...7c2 ./mezo-contracts/BitcoinSafeOwner.sol
- 691...c94 ./mezo-contracts/OrangeKitDeployer.sol
- 711...bab ./mezo-contracts/OrangeKitSafeFactory.sol
- acf...89e ./mezo-contracts/AbstractTBTCDepositor.sol

Tests

- 573...055 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/vault/TBTCVault.OptimisticMinting.test.ts
- 1fc...4e7 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/vault/TBTCVault.Redemption.test.ts
- 2ea...340 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/vault/TBTCVault.test.ts
- ef9...976 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/vault/DonationVault.test.ts
- 355...79d ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/helpers/contract-test-helpers.ts
- e4d...927 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/data/moving-funds.ts
- 1c1...a3a ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/data/deposit-sweep.ts
- e54...080 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/data/ecdsa.ts

- 593...a19 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/data/redemption.ts
- 366...f63 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/data/fraud.ts
- a83...f71 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/relay/LightRelayMaintainerProxy.test.ts
- bed...d84 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/relay/LightRelay.test.ts
- e1a...414 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/fixtures/bridge.ts
- 403...771 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/fixtures/index.ts
- 68a...cf0 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/l2/L2BTC.test.ts
- 14c...874 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/l2/L2WormholeGateway.test.ts
- 9f0...99d ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/FullFlow.test.ts
- 7ed...0a9 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/WalletCreation.test.ts
- 19d...ec7 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/Slashing.test.ts
- 414...acd ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/data/integration.ts
- 88a...aa4 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/data/bls.ts
- e8b...fbd ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/utils/random-beacon.ts
- 3c7...150 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/utils/ecdsa-wallet-registry.ts
- f0a...f0f ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/utils/gas.ts
- 1ff...f7a ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/utils/staking.ts
- dc0...736 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/utils/fake-random-beacon.ts
- b61...ad0 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integration/utils/fixture.ts
- d0d...d72 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/maintainer/MaintainerProxy.test.ts
- a34...214 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Redemption.test.ts
- 0e9...7c8 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/WalletProposalValidator.test.ts
- 932...326 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Parameters.test.ts
- 769...7b5 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/BitcoinTx.test.ts
- 0e0...a51 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Wallets.test.ts
- 84f...486 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Deposit.test.ts
- 28f...e2a ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Governance.test.ts
- c48...c29 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/VendingMachine.Upgrade.test.ts
- 5ca...139 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.MovingFunds.test.ts
- 421...cb7 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Heartbeat.test.ts
- 604...ff9 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Vaults.test.ts
- 5fc...4e8 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Bridge.Frauds.test.ts
- e96...60e ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/VendingMachineV3.test.ts
- 26c...c27 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/VendingMachine.test.ts
- daf...52b ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/Deployment.test.ts
- 6d0...5b1 ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/VendingMachineV2.test.ts
- 027...ffa ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bridge/EcdsaLib.test.ts
- db4...95c ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/bank/Bank.test.ts
- 7df...bba ./mezo-tests/keepnetwork-test/integrator/AbstractBTCDepositor.test.ts
- 4c9...4ff ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/OrangeKitSafeFactory.upgrades.test.ts
- 405...0c4 ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/BitcoinSafeOwner.test.ts
- 8fe...2e8 ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/OrangeKitDeployer.test.ts
- 519...59f ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/EmergencyGovernance.test.ts
- dd8...e3c ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/SafeWithBitcoinOwner.test.ts
- 9d9...32b ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/BitcoinSafeOwner.upgrade.test.ts
- ccf...99e ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/OrangeKitSafeFactory.test.ts
- 48c...08e ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/helpers/snapshot.ts
- 018...d6e ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/helpers/testBitcoinWallet.ts
- bac...aed ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/helpers/bitcoinSafeOwner.test.ts
- b90...e99 ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/helpers/bitcoinSafeOwner.ts
- 2cc...9af ./mezo-tests/orangekit-test/fixtures/orangeKitFixture.ts
- c9b...0f0 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.lock.test.ts
- 1ac...60f ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.deposit.test.ts
- b39...cf5 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.test.ts
- 7bb...781 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/BitcoinDepositor.test.ts

- 75c...052 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.receiveApproval.test.ts
- 712...438 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.upgrades.test.ts
- 7ae...6d0 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.withdraw.test.ts
- 8e2...3ce ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/Portal.depositFor.test.ts
- e96...46b ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/fixtures/deployPortal.ts
- dc3...3d0 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/integration/LockPeriod.test.ts
- dc8...a45 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/integration/SupportedTokens.test.ts
- bc6...7d9 ./mezo-tests/mezoportal-test/integration/Depositing.test.ts

Toolset

The notes below outline the setup and steps performed in the process of this audit.

Setup

Tool Setup:

- [Slither](#) [v0.10.0](#)

Steps taken to run the tools:

1. Install the Slither tool: `pip3 install slither-analyzer`
2. Run Slither from the project directory: `slither .`

Automated Analysis

Slither

No important issues were detected using Slither.

Test Suite Results

We were able to run all tests without failure.

```
Unit tests for 'keep-network/tbtc-v2'
```

```
Bank
```

```
  PERMIT_TYPEHASH
```

```
    ✓ should be keccak256 of EIP2612 Permit message
```

```
updateBridge
```

```
  when called by a third party
```

```
    ✓ should revert
```

```
  when called with 0-address bridge
```

```
    ✓ should revert
```

```
  when called by the governance
```

```
    ✓ should update the bridge
```

```
    ✓ should emit the BridgeUpdated event
```

```
transferBalance
```

```
  when the recipient is the zero address
```

```
    ✓ should revert
```

```
  when the recipient is the bank address
```

```
    ✓ should revert
```

```
  when the spender has not enough balance
```

```
    ✓ should revert
```

```
  when the spender transfers part of their balance
```

```
    ✓ should transfer the requested amount
```

```
    ✓ should emit the BalanceTransferred event
```

```
  when the spender transfers part of their balance in two transactions
```

```
    ✓ should transfer the requested amount
```

```
  when the spender transfers their entire balance
```

```
    ✓ should transfer the entire balance
```

```
    ✓ should emit the BalanceTransferred event
```

```
  when the spender transfers 0 balance
```

```
    ✓ should transfer no balance
```

```
    ✓ should emit the BalanceTransferred event
```

```
approveBalanceAndCall
  when the spender is the zero address
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender callback reverted
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender had no approved balance before
    ✓ should approve the requested amount
    ✓ should emit the BalanceApproved event
    ✓ should call receiveBalanceApproval
  when the spender had an approved balance before
    ✓ should replace the previous allowance
    ✓ should call receiveBalanceApproval
approveBalance
  when the spender is the zero address
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender had no approved balance before
    when setting approval to non-zero amount
      ✓ should approve the requested amount
      ✓ should emit the BalanceApproved event
    when setting approval to zero
      ✓ should not change the zero approval
      ✓ should emit the BalanceApproved event
  when the spender had an approved balance before
    when setting approval back to zero
      ✓ should replace the previous allowance with zero
    when trying to overwrite with a non-zero value
      ✓ should revert
increaseBalanceAllowance
  when the spender is the zero address
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender had no approved balance before
    ✓ should approve the requested amount
    ✓ should emit the BalanceApproved event
  when the spender had an approved balance before
    ✓ should increase the previous allowance
  when the spender has a maximum allowance
    ✓ should revert
decreaseBalanceAllowance
  when the spender is the zero address
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender had no approved balance before
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender had an approved balance before
    ✓ should decrease the previous allowance
transferBalanceFrom
  when the recipient is the zero address
    ✓ should revert
  when the recipient is the bank address
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender has not enough balance approved
    ✓ should revert
  when the owner has not enough balance
    ✓ should revert
  when the spender transfers part of the approved balance
    ✓ should transfer the requested amount
    ✓ should emit the BalanceTransferred event
    ✓ should reduce the spender allowance
  when the spender transfers part of the approved balance in two transactions
    ✓ should transfer the requested amount
    ✓ should emit BalanceTransferred events
    ✓ should reduce the spender allowance
  when the spender transfers the entire approved balance
    ✓ should transfer the requested amount
    ✓ should reduce the spender allowance to zero
  when the spender transfers the entire balance
    ✓ should transfer the requested amount
    ✓ should reduce the spender allowance to zero
  when given the maximum allowance
    ✓ should not reduce the spender allowance
permit
  when permission expired
    ✓ should revert
```

- when permission has an invalid signature
 - when owner does `not` match the permitting one
 - ✓ should revert
 - when spender does `not` match the signature
 - ✓ should revert
 - when permitted balance does `not` match the signature
 - ✓ should revert
 - when permitted deadline does `not` match the signature
 - ✓ should revert
- when the spender is the zero address
 - ✓ should revert
- when the spender had no permitted balance before
 - ✓ should approve the requested amount
 - ✓ should emit the BalanceApproved event
 - ✓ should increment the nonce for the permitting owner
- when the spender had a permitted balance before
 - ✓ should replace the previous approval
 - ✓ should emit the BalanceApproved event
 - ✓ should increment the nonce for the permitting owner
- when given never expiring permit
 - ✓ should be accepted at any moment
- increaseBalance
 - when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the **bridge**
 - when increasing balance for the Bank
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called for a valid recipient
 - ✓ should increase recipient's balance
 - ✓ should emit the BalanceIncreased event
- increaseBalances
 - when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the **bridge**
 - when increasing balance for the bank
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there is more recipients than amounts
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there is more amounts than recipients
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called for a valid recipient
 - ✓ should increase recipients' balances
 - ✓ should emit BalanceIncreased events
- increaseBalanceAndCall
 - when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the **bridge**
 - ✓ should increase vault's balance
 - ✓ should emit BalanceIncreased event
 - ✓ should call the vault
 - when depositors `array` has greater length than deposited amounts `array`
 - ✓ should revert
 - when deposited amounts `array` has greater length than depositors `array`
 - ✓ should revert
- decreaseBalance
 - ✓ should decrease caller's balance
 - ✓ should emit the BalanceDecreased event
- DOMAIN_SEPARATOR
 - ✓ should be keccak256 of EIP712 domain struct

BitcoinTx

- validateProof
 - when used with a valid but `long` proof
 - ✓ should validate the proof with success
 - ✓ should consume around 95000 gas

Bridge - Deposit

transferred 4500000000 T to the VendingMachine for KEEP
transferred 4500000000 T to the VendingMachine for NU
Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of WalletRegistry

You are using the ``unsafeAllow.external-library-linking`` flag to include external libraries.

Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of BridgeStub

You are using the `unsafeAllow.external-library-linking` flag to include external libraries.
Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

Initialized Wallet Owner address: 0x3c705dB336C81c7FEFC5746e283aB2c0781A4B7b in transaction:
0x4c54557085513b45258fe2a2f2b11d7b8abe6f870942f0d513209c4d26df7624

revealDeposit

when wallet is in Live state

when reveal ahead period validation is disabled

when funding transaction is P2SH

when funding output script hash is correct

when deposit was **not** revealed yet

when amount is **not** below the dust threshold

when deposit is routed to a trusted vault

✓ should store proper deposit data

✓ should emit DepositRevealed event

when deposit is **not** routed to a vault

✓ should accept the deposit

when deposit treasury fee is zero

✓ should store proper deposit data

✓ should accept the deposit

when deposit is routed to a non-trusted vault

✓ should revert

when amount is below the dust threshold

✓ should revert

when deposit was already revealed

✓ should revert

when funding output script hash is wrong

✓ should revert

when the caller address does **not** match the funding output script

✓ should revert

when funding transaction embeds extra data

✓ should revert

when funding transaction is P2WSH

when funding output script hash is correct

when deposit was **not** revealed yet

when deposit is routed to a trusted vault

✓ should store proper deposit data

✓ should emit DepositRevealed event

when deposit is **not** routed to a vault

✓ should accept the deposit

when deposit is routed to a non-trusted vault

✓ should revert

when deposit was already revealed

✓ should revert

when funding output script hash is wrong

✓ should revert

when the caller address does **not** match the funding output script

✓ should revert

when funding transaction embeds extra data

✓ should revert

when funding transaction is neither P2SH nor P2WSH

✓ should revert

when reveal ahead period validation is enabled

when reveal ahead period is preserved

✓ should pass the refund locktime validation

when reveal ahead period is **not** preserved

✓ should revert

when refund locktime integer value is less than 500M

✓ should revert

when wallet is **not** in Live state

when wallet state is Unknown

✓ should revert

when wallet state is MovingFunds

✓ should revert

when the source wallet is in the Closing state

✓ should revert

when wallet state is Closed

✓ should revert

```
when wallet state is Terminated
  ✓ should revert
revealDepositWithExtraData
when extra data is non-zero
  when wallet is in Live state
    when reveal ahead period validation is disabled
      when funding transaction is P2SH
        when funding output script hash is correct
          when deposit was not revealed yet
            when amount is not below the dust threshold
              when deposit is routed to a trusted vault
                ✓ should store proper deposit data
                ✓ should emit DepositRevealed event
              when deposit is not routed to a vault
                ✓ should accept the deposit
            when deposit treasury fee is zero
              ✓ should store proper deposit data
              ✓ should accept the deposit
            when deposit is routed to a non-trusted vault
              ✓ should revert
          when amount is below the dust threshold
            ✓ should revert
        when deposit was already revealed
          ✓ should revert
      when funding output script hash is wrong
        ✓ should revert
    when the caller address does not match the funding output script
      ✓ should revert
    when the revealed extra data do not match
      ✓ should revert
    when funding transaction does not embed extra data
      ✓ should revert
  when funding transaction is P2WSH
    when funding output script hash is correct
      when deposit was not revealed yet
        when deposit is routed to a trusted vault
          ✓ should store proper deposit data
          ✓ should emit DepositRevealed event
        when deposit is not routed to a vault
          ✓ should accept the deposit
        when deposit is routed to a non-trusted vault
          ✓ should revert
      when deposit was already revealed
        ✓ should revert
    when funding output script hash is wrong
      ✓ should revert
    when the caller address does not match the funding output script
      ✓ should revert
    when the revealed extra data do not match
      ✓ should revert
    when funding transaction does not embed extra data
      ✓ should revert
  when funding transaction is neither P2SH nor P2WSH
    ✓ should revert
when reveal ahead period validation is enabled
  when reveal ahead period is preserved
    ✓ should pass the refund locktime validation
  when reveal ahead period is not preserved
    ✓ should revert
  when refund locktime integer value is less than 500M
    ✓ should revert
when wallet is not in Live state
  when wallet state is Unknown
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is MovingFunds
    ✓ should revert
  when the source wallet is in the Closing state
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is Closed
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is Terminated
    ✓ should revert
```

```

when extra data is zero
  ✓ should revert
submitDepositSweepProof
  when the wallet state is Live
    when transaction proof is valid
      when there is only one output
        when the single output is 20-byte
          when single output is either P2PKH or P2WPKH
            when main UTXO data are valid
              when transaction fee does not exceed the deposit transaction maximum fee
                when there is only one input
                  when the single input is a revealed unswept P2SH deposit
                    ✓ should mark deposit as swept
                    ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
                    ✓ should update the depositor's balance
                    ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
                    ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event
                  when the single input is a revealed unswept P2WSH deposit
                    ✓ should mark deposit as swept
                    ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
                    ✓ should update the depositor's balance
                    ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
                    ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event
                  when the single input is a revealed unswept deposit with a trusted vault
                    ✓ should mark deposit as swept
                    ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
                    ✓ should not update the depositor's balance
                    ✓ should update the vault's balance
                    ✓ should call the vault's receiveBalanceIncrease function
                    ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
                    ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event
                when the deposit treasury fee is zero
                    ✓ should update the depositor's balance
                    ✓ should collect no treasury fee
                when the single input is a revealed unswept deposit with a non-trusted vault
                    ✓ should mark deposit as swept
                    ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
                    ✓ should update the depositor's balance
                    ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
                    ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event
                when the single input is a revealed unswept deposit with a trusted vault but non-
equal to the vault passed via function parameter
                    ✓ should revert
                when the single input is the expected main UTXO
                    ✓ should revert
                when the single input is a revealed but already swept deposit
                    ✓ should revert
                when the single input is an unknown
                    ✓ should revert
            when there are multiple inputs
              when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits and the expected main
UTXO
                  ✓ should mark deposits as swept
                  ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
                  ✓ should update the depositors balances
                  ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
                  ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
                  ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event
              when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits with a trusted vault
and the expected main UTXO
                  ✓ should mark deposits as swept
                  ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
                  ✓ should not update the depositors balances
                  ✓ should update the vault's balance
                  ✓ should call the vault's receiveBalanceIncrease function
                  ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
                  ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
                  ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event
              when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits with a non-trusted
vault and the expected main UTXO
                  ✓ should mark deposits as swept
                  ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet

```

- ✓ should update the depositors balances
- ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
- ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
- ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event

when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits with different trusted vaults **and** the expected main UTXO

- ✓ should revert

when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits but there is no main UTXO since it is **not** expected

- ✓ should mark deposits as swept
- ✓ should update main UTXO for the given wallet
- ✓ should update the depositors balances
- ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
- ✓ should emit DepositsSwept event

when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits but there is no main UTXO despite it is expected

- ✓ should revert

when input vector contains a revealed but already swept deposit

- ✓ should revert

when input vector contains an unknown input

- ✓ should revert

when transaction fee exceeds the deposit transaction maximum fee

- ✓ should revert

when main UTXO data are invalid

- ✓ should revert

when single output is neither P2PKH nor P2WPKH

- ✓ should revert

when the single output is **not** 20-byte

- ✓ should revert

when output count is other than one

- ✓ should revert

when transaction proof is **not** valid

when input vector is **not** valid

- ✓ should revert

when output vector is **not** valid

- ✓ should revert

when transaction is **not** on same level of merkle tree as coinbase

- ✓ should revert

when merkle proof is **not** valid

- ✓ should revert

when coinbase merkle proof is **not** valid

- ✓ should revert

when proof difficulty is **not** current nor previous

- ✓ should revert

when headers chain length is **not** valid

- ✓ should revert

when headers chain is **not** valid

- ✓ should revert

when the work in the header is insufficient

- ✓ should revert

when accumulated difficulty in headers chain is insufficient

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of BridgeStub

You are using the ``unsafeAllow.external-library-linking`` flag to include external libraries. Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

- ✓ should revert

when transaction data is limited to 64 bytes

- ✓ should revert

when the wallet state is MovingFunds

- ✓ should succeed

when the wallet state is neither Live **or** MovingFunds

when wallet state is Unknown

- ✓ should revert

when wallet state is Closing

- ✓ should revert

when wallet state is Closed

- ✓ should revert

when wallet state is Terminated

- ✓ should revert

```
submitFraudChallenge
  when the wallet is in Live state
    when the amount of ETH deposited is enough
      when the data needed for signature verification is correct
        when the fraud challenge does not exist yet
          ✓ should transfer ether from the caller to the bridge
          ✓ should store the fraud challenge data
          ✓ should emit FraudChallengeSubmitted event
        when the fraud challenge already exists
          ✓ should revert
      when incorrect wallet public key is used
        ✓ should revert
      when incorrect sighash is used
        ✓ should revert
      when incorrect recovery ID is used
        ✓ should revert
      when incorrect signature data is used
        ✓ should revert
    when the amount of ETH deposited is too low
      ✓ should revert
  when the wallet is in MovingFunds state
    ✓ should succeed
  when the wallet is in Closing state
    ✓ should succeed
  when the wallet is in neither Live nor MovingFunds nor Closing state
    when wallet state is Unknown
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Closed
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Terminated
      ✓ should revert
defeatFraudChallengeWithHeartbeat
  when the challenge exists
    when the challenge is open
      when the heartbeat message has correct format
        ✓ should mark the challenge as resolved
        ✓ should send the ether deposited by the challenger to the treasury
        ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
      when the heartbeat message has no correct format
        ✓ should revert
    when the challenge is resolved by defeat
      ✓ should revert
    when the challenge is resolved by timeout
      ✓ should revert
  when the challenge does not exist
    ✓ should revert
defeatFraudChallenge
  when the challenge exists
    when the challenge is open
      when the sighash type is correct
        when the input is non-witness
          when the transaction has single input
            when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
              ✓ should mark the challenge as resolved
              ✓ should send the ether deposited by the challenger to the treasury
              ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
            when the input is not marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
              ✓ should revert
          when the transaction has multiple inputs
            when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
              ✓ should mark the challenge as resolved
              ✓ should send the ether deposited by the challenger to the treasury
              ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
            when the input is not marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
              ✓ should revert
        when the input is witness
          when the transaction has single input
            when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
              ✓ should mark the challenge as resolved
              ✓ should send the ether deposited by the challenger to the treasury
              ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
            when the input is not marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
```

- ✓ should revert
- when the transaction has multiple inputs
 - when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
 - ✓ should mark the challenge as resolved
 - ✓ should send the ether deposited by the challenger to the treasury
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
 - when the input is `not` marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
 - ✓ should revert
- when the sighash type is incorrect
 - ✓ should revert
- when the challenge is resolved by defeat
 - ✓ should revert
- when the challenge is resolved by timeout
 - ✓ should revert
- when the challenge does `not` exist
 - ✓ should revert
- notifyFraudChallengeDefeatTimeout
- when the fraud challenge exists
 - when the fraud challenge is open
 - when the fraud challenge has timed out
 - when the wallet is in the Live `or` MovingFunds `or` Closing state
 - when wallet state is Live but the wallet is `not` the active one
 - ✓ should mark the fraud challenge as resolved
 - ✓ should `return` the deposited ether to the challenger
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimedOut event
 - ✓ should change the wallet state to Terminated
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should decrease the live wallets count
 - ✓ should `not` unset the active wallet
 - when wallet state is Live `and` the wallet is the active one
 - ✓ should mark the fraud challenge as resolved
 - ✓ should `return` the deposited ether to the challenger
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimedOut event
 - ✓ should change the wallet state to Terminated
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should decrease the live wallets count
 - ✓ should unset the active wallet
 - when wallet state is MovingFunds
 - ✓ should mark the fraud challenge as resolved
 - ✓ should `return` the deposited ether to the challenger
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimedOut event
 - ✓ should change the wallet state to Terminated
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - when wallet state is Closing
 - ✓ should mark the fraud challenge as resolved
 - ✓ should `return` the deposited ether to the challenger
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimedOut event
 - ✓ should change the wallet state to Terminated
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
- when the wallet is in the Terminated state
 - ✓ should mark the fraud challenge as resolved
 - ✓ should `return` the deposited ether to the challenger
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimedOut event
 - ✓ should `not` change the wallet state
 - ✓ should `not` call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
- when the wallet is neither in the Live nor MovingFunds nor Closing nor Terminated state
 - when the wallet is in the Unknown state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the wallet is in the Closed state
 - ✓ should revert
- when the fraud challenge has `not` timed out yet
 - ✓ should revert
- when the fraud challenge is resolved by challenge defeat
 - ✓ should revert

- when the fraud challenge is resolved by previous timeout notification
 - ✓ should revert
- when the fraud challenge does **not** exist
 - ✓ should revert

Bridge – Governance

beginGovernanceDelayUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the governance delay

finalizeGovernanceDelayUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
- when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the governance delay
 - ✓ should reset the governance delay timer

beginBridgeGovernanceTransfer

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the **bridge** governance
 - ✓ should **not** update the **bridge** governance owner
 - ✓ should emit BridgeGovernanceTransferStarted event

finalizeBridgeGovernanceTransfer

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
- when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the **bridge** governance
 - ✓ should **not** update the **bridge**Governance owner

beginDepositDustThresholdUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the deposit dust threshold
 - ✓ should emit DepositDustThresholdUpdateStarted event

finalizeDepositDustThresholdUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
- when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the deposit dust threshold
 - ✓ should emit DepositDustThresholdUpdated event

beginDepositTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the deposit treasury fee divisor
 - ✓ should emit DepositTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdateStarted event

finalizeDepositTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
- when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the deposit treasury fee divisor
 - ✓ should emit DepositTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdated event

beginDepositTxMaxFeeUpdate

- when the caller is **not** the owner

- ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the deposit tx max fee
 - ✓ should emit DepositTxMaxFeeUpdateStarted event
- finalizeDepositTxMaxFeeUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the deposit tx max fee
 - ✓ should emit DepositTxMaxFeeUpdated event
- beginDepositRevealAheadPeriodUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the deposit reveal ahead period
 - ✓ should emit DepositRevealAheadPeriodUpdateStarted event
- finalizeDepositRevealAheadPeriodUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the deposit reveal ahead period
 - ✓ should emit DepositRevealAheadPeriodUpdated event
- beginRedemptionDustThresholdUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the redemption dust threshold
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionDustThresholdUpdateStarted event
- finalizeRedemptionDustThresholdUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the redemption dust threshold
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionDustThresholdUpdated event
- beginRedemptionTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the redemption treasury fee divisor
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdateStarted event
- finalizeRedemptionTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the redemption treasury fee divisor
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTreasuryFeeDivisorUpdated event
- beginRedemptionTxMaxTotalFeeUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the redemption tx max total fee
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTxMaxTotalFeeUpdateStarted event
- finalizeRedemptionTxMaxTotalFeeUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized

- ✓ should revert
- when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the redemption tx max total fee
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTxMaxTotalFeeUpdated event
- beginRedemptionTimeoutUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the redemption timeout
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimeoutUpdateStarted event
- finalizeRedemptionTimeoutUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the redemption timeout
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimeoutUpdated event
- beginRedemptionTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the redemption timeout slashing amount
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdateStarted event
- finalizeRedemptionTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the redemption timeout slashing amount
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdated event
- beginRedemptionTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the redemption timeout notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdateStarted event
- finalizeRedemptionTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the redemption timeout notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdated event
- beginMovingFundsTxMaxTotalFeeUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moving funds tx max total fee
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTxMaxTotalFeeUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovingFundsTxMaxTotalFeeUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the moving funds tx max total fee
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTxMaxTotalFeeUpdated event
- beginMovingFundsDustThresholdUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner

- ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moving funds dust threshold
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsDustThresholdUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovingFundsDustThresholdUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the moving funds dust threshold
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsDustThresholdUpdated event
- beginMovingFundsTimeoutResetDelayUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moving funds timeout reset delay
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutResetDelayUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovingFundsTimeoutResetDelayUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the moving funds timeout reset delay
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutResetDelayUpdated event
- beginMovingFundsTimeoutUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moving funds timeout
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovingFundsTimeoutUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the moving funds timeout
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutUpdated event
- beginMovingFundsTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moving funds timeout slashing amount
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovingFundsTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the moving funds timeout slashing amount
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdated event
- beginMovingFundsTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moving funds timeout notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovingFundsTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized

✓ should revert
when the governance delay has **not** passed
✓ should revert
when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
✓ should update the moving funds timeout notifier reward multiplier
✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdated event

beginMovingFundsCommitmentGasOffsetUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the caller is the owner
✓ should **not** update the moving funds commitment gas offset
✓ should emit MovingFundsCommitmentGasOffsetUpdateStarted event

finalizeMovingFundsCommitmentGasOffsetUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the update process is **not** initialized
✓ should revert
when the governance delay has **not** passed
✓ should revert
when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
✓ should update the moving funds commitment gas offset
✓ should emit MovingFundsCommitmentGasOffsetUpdated event

beginMovedFundsSweepTxMaxTotalFeeUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the caller is the owner
✓ should **not** update the moved funds sweep tx max total fee
✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTxMaxTotalFeeUpdateStarted event

finalizeMovedFundsSweepTxMaxTotalFeeUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the update process is **not** initialized
✓ should revert
when the governance delay has **not** passed
✓ should revert
when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
✓ should update the moved funds sweep tx max total fee
✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTxMaxTotalFeeUpdated event

beginMovedFundsSweepTimeoutUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the caller is the owner
✓ should **not** update the moved funds sweep timeout
✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimeoutUpdateStarted event

finalizeMovedFundsSweepTimeoutUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the update process is **not** initialized
✓ should revert
when the governance delay has **not** passed
✓ should revert
when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
✓ should update the moved funds sweep timeout
✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimeoutUpdated event

beginMovedFundsSweepTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the caller is the owner
✓ should **not** update the moved funds sweep timeout slashing amount
✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdateStarted event

finalizeMovedFundsSweepTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner
✓ should revert
when the update process is **not** initialized
✓ should revert
when the governance delay has **not** passed
✓ should revert
when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
✓ should update the moved funds sweep timeout slashing amount
✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimeoutSlashingAmountUpdated event

beginMovedFundsSweepTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate
when the caller is **not** the owner

- ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the moved funds sweep timeout notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdateStarted event
- finalizeMovedFundsSweepTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the moved funds sweep timeout notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimeoutNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdated event
- beginWalletCreationPeriodUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet creation period
 - ✓ should emit WalletCreationPeriodUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletCreationPeriodUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet creation period
 - ✓ should emit WalletCreationPeriodUpdated event
- beginWalletCreationMinBtcBalanceUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet creation min btc balance
 - ✓ should emit WalletCreationMinBtcBalanceUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletCreationMinBtcBalanceUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet creation min btc balance
 - ✓ should emit WalletCreationMinBtcBalanceUpdated event
- beginWalletCreationMaxBtcBalanceUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet creation max btc balance
 - ✓ should emit WalletCreationMaxBtcBalanceUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletCreationMaxBtcBalanceUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet creation max btc balance
 - ✓ should emit WalletCreationMaxBtcBalanceUpdated event
- beginWalletClosureMinBtcBalanceUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet closure min btc balance
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosureMinBtcBalanceUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletClosureMinBtcBalanceUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized

- ✓ should revert
- when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet closure min btc balance
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosureMinBtcBalanceUpdated event
- beginWalletMaxAgeUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet max age
 - ✓ should emit WalletMaxAgeUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletMaxAgeUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet max age
 - ✓ should emit WalletMaxAgeUpdated event
- beginWalletMaxBtcTransferUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet max btc transfer
 - ✓ should emit WalletMaxBtcTransferUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletMaxBtcTransferUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet max btc transfer
 - ✓ should emit WalletMaxBtcTransferUpdated event
- beginWalletClosingPeriodUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the wallet closing period
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosingPeriodUpdateStarted event
- finalizeWalletClosingPeriodUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the wallet closing period
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosingPeriodUpdated event
- beginFraudChallengeDepositAmountUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the fraud challenge deposit amount
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDepositAmountUpdateStarted event
- finalizeFraudChallengeDepositAmountUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the fraud challenge deposit amount
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDepositAmountUpdated event
- beginFraudChallengeDefeatTimeoutUpdate
 - when the caller is **not** the owner

- ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the fraud challenge defeat timeout
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimeoutUpdateStarted event
- finalizeFraudChallengeDefeatTimeoutUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the fraud challenge defeat timeout
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeatTimeoutUpdated event
- beginFraudSlashingAmountUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the fraud slashing amount
 - ✓ should emit FraudSlashingAmountUpdateStarted event
- finalizeFraudSlashingAmountUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the fraud slashing amount
 - ✓ should emit FraudSlashingAmountUpdated event
- beginFraudNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the fraud notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit FraudNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdateStarted event
- finalizeFraudNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the fraud notifier reward multiplier
 - ✓ should emit FraudNotifierRewardMultiplierUpdated event
- beginTreasuryUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should **not** update the treasury address
 - ✓ should emit TreasuryUpdateStarted event
- finalizeTreasuryUpdate**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the update process is initialized **and** governance delay passed
 - ✓ should update the treasury address
 - ✓ should emit TreasuryUpdated event
- setVaultStatus**
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should mark the vault as trusted
 - ✓ should emit VaultStatusUpdated event
- setRedemptionWatchtower**
 - when caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when caller is the owner

✓ should `not` revert

Bridge – Moving funds

submitMovingFundsCommitment

- when source wallet is in the MovingFunds state
 - when source wallet has no pending redemptions
 - when source wallet has no pending moved funds sweep requests
 - when the commitment was `not` submitted yet
 - when the caller is a member of the source wallet
 - when passed wallet main UTXO is valid
 - when wallet balance is greater than zero
 - when the expected target wallets count is greater than zero
 - when the submitted target wallets count is same as the expected
 - when all target wallets are different than the source wallet
 - when all target wallets follow the expected order
 - when all target wallets are in the Live state
 - ✓ should store the target wallets commitment for the given wallet
 - ✓ should emit the MovingFundsCommitmentSubmitted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when one of the target wallets is `not` in the Live state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when one of the target wallets break the expected order
 - ✓ should revert
 - when one of the target wallets is same as the source wallet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the submitted target wallets count is other than the expected
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the expected target wallets count is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet balance is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when passed wallet main UTXO is invalid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is `not` a member of the source wallet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the commitment was already submitted
 - ✓ should revert
 - when source wallet has pending moved funds sweep requests
 - ✓ should revert
 - when source wallet has pending redemptions
 - ✓ should revert
 - when source wallet is `not` in the MovingFunds state
 - when the source wallet is in the Unknown state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Live state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Closing state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Closed state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Terminated state
 - ✓ should revert

resetMovingFundsTimeout

- when the wallet is in the MovingFunds state
 - when the wallet's commitment is `not` submitted yet
 - when Live wallets count is zero
 - when reset delay has elapsed
 - ✓ should reset the moving funds timeout
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutReset event
 - when reset delay has `not` elapsed yet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when one reset occurred `and` the reset delay has elapsed again
 - ✓ should reset the moving funds timeout
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutReset event
 - when one reset occurred `and` the reset delay has `not` elapsed yet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when Live wallets count is `not` zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the wallet's commitment is already submitted
 - ✓ should revert
- when the wallet is `not` in the MovingFunds state
 - when the wallet is in the Unknown state

- ✓ should revert
- when transaction fee is too high
 - ✓ should revert
- when transaction amount is **not** distributed evenly
 - ✓ should revert
- when the output vector contains P2SH output
 - ✓ should revert
- when the output vector does **not** only reference 20-byte hashes
 - ✓ should revert
- when the single input doesn't point to the wallet's main UTXO
 - ✓ should revert
- when input count is other than one
 - ✓ should revert
- when main UTXO data are invalid
 - ✓ should revert
- when there is no main UTXO for the given wallet
 - ✓ should revert
- when transaction proof is **not** valid
- when input vector is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
- when output vector is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
- when transaction is **not** on same level of merkle tree as coinbase
 - ✓ should revert
- when merkle proof is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
- when coinbase merkle proof is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
- when proof difficulty is **not** current nor previous
 - ✓ should revert
- when headers chain length is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
- when headers chain is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
- when the work in the header is insufficient
 - ✓ should revert
- when accumulated difficulty in headers chain is insufficient

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of BridgeStub

You are using the `unsafeAllow.external-library-linking` flag to include external libraries. Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

- ✓ should revert
- when transaction data is limited to 64 bytes
 - ✓ should revert
- notifyMovingFundsTimeout
 - when source wallet is in the MovingFunds state
 - when the moving funds process has timed out
 - ✓ should switch the wallet to Terminated state
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminatedevent
 - ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimedOut event
 - when the moving funds process has **not** timed out
 - ✓ should revert
 - when source wallet is **not** in the MovingFunds state
 - when the source wallet is in the Unknown state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Live state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Closing state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Closed state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source wallet is in the Terminated state
 - ✓ should revert
- notifyMovingFundsBelowDust
 - when the wallet is in the MovingFunds state
 - when the main UTXO parameter is valid
 - when the balance is below the dust threshold
 - ✓ should change wallet's state to Closing
 - ✓ should set the wallet's closing started timestamp

- ✓ should revert
 - when transaction fee exceeds the sweep transaction maximum fee
 - ✓ should revert
 - when main UTXO data are invalid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when sweeping wallet is in the MovingFunds state
 - ✓ should succeed
 - when sweeping wallet is neither in the Live nor MovingFunds state
 - when sweeping wallet is in the Unknown state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when sweeping wallet is in the Closing state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when sweeping wallet is in the Closed state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when sweeping wallet is in the Terminated state
 - ✓ should revert
 - when single output is neither P2PKH nor P2WPKH
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the single output is **not** 20-byte
 - ✓ should revert
 - when output count is other than one
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction proof is **not** valid
 - when input vector is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when output vector is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction is **not** on same level of merkle tree as coinbase
 - ✓ should revert
 - when merkle proof is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when coinbase merkle proof is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when proof difficulty is **not** current nor previous
 - ✓ should revert
 - when headers chain length is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when headers chain is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the work in the header is insufficient
 - ✓ should revert
 - when accumulated difficulty in headers chain is insufficient

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of BridgeStub

You are using the `unsafeAllow.external-library-linking` flag to include external libraries. Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

- ✓ should revert
 - when transaction data is limited to 64 bytes
 - ✓ should revert
- notifyMovedFundsSweepTimeout
 - when moved funds sweep request is in the Pending state
 - when moved funds sweep request has timed out
 - when the wallet is either in the Live **or** MovingFunds state
 - when the wallet is in the Live state but the wallet is **not** the active one
 - ✓ should switch the moved funds sweep request to the TimedOut state
 - ✓ should decrease the number of pending moved funds sweep requests for the given wallet
 - ✓ should switch the wallet to Terminated state
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
 - ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimedOut event
 - ✓ should decrease the live wallets count
 - ✓ should **not** unset the active wallet
 - when the wallet is in the Live state **and** the wallet is the active one
 - ✓ should switch the moved funds sweep request to the TimedOut state
 - ✓ should decrease the number of pending moved funds sweep requests for the given wallet
 - ✓ should switch the wallet to Terminated state
 - ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
 - ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's closeWallet function
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimedOut event

- ✓ should decrease the live wallets count
- ✓ should unset the active wallet

when the wallet is in the MovingFunds state

- ✓ should switch the moved funds sweep request to the TimedOut state
- ✓ should decrease the number of pending moved funds sweep requests for the given wallet
- ✓ should switch the wallet to Terminated state
- ✓ should emit WalletTerminated event
- ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's closeWallet function
- ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
- ✓ should emit MovedFundsSweepTimedOut event

when the wallet is in the Terminated state

- ✓ should switch the moved funds sweep request to the TimedOut state
- ✓ should decrease the number of pending moved funds sweep requests for the given wallet
- ✓ should **not** change the wallet state

when the wallet is neither in the Live nor MovingFunds nor Terminated state

when the wallet is in the Unknown state

- ✓ should revert

when the wallet is in the Closing state

- ✓ should revert

when the wallet is in the Closed state

- ✓ should revert

when moved funds sweep request has **not** timed out yet

- ✓ should revert

when moved funds sweep request is **not** in the Pending state

when moved funds sweep request is in the Unknown state

- ✓ should revert

when moved funds sweep request is in the Processed state

- ✓ should revert

when moved funds sweep request is in the TimedOut state

- ✓ should revert

Bridge – Parameters

updateDepositParameters

when caller is the contract guvnor

when all **new** parameter values are correct

- ✓ should set correct values
- ✓ should emit DepositParametersUpdated event

when **new** deposit dust threshold is zero

- ✓ should revert

when **new** deposit dust threshold is same as deposit TX max fee

- ✓ should revert

when **new** deposit dust threshold is lower than deposit TX max fee

- ✓ should revert

when **new** deposit transaction max fee is zero

- ✓ should revert

when caller is **not** the contract guvnor

- ✓ should revert
- ✓ should revert
- ✓ should revert
- ✓ should revert

updateRedemptionParameters

when caller is the contract guvnor

when all **new** parameter values are correct

- ✓ should set correct values
- ✓ should emit RedemptionParametersUpdated event

when **new** redemption dust threshold is **not** greater than moving funds dust threshold

- ✓ should revert

when **new** redemption dust threshold is same as redemption tx max fee

- ✓ should revert

when **new** redemption dust threshold is lower than redemption tx max fee

- ✓ should revert

when **new** redemption transaction max fee is zero

- ✓ should revert

```
when new redemption transaction max total fee is lesser than the redemption transaction per-
request max fee
  ✓ should revert
when new redemption timeout is zero
  ✓ should revert
when new redemption timeout notifier reward multiplier is greater than 100
  ✓ should revert
when caller is not the contract guvnor
  ✓ should revert
  ✓ should revert
updateMovingFundsParameters
when caller is the contract guvnor
  when all new parameter values are correct
    ✓ should set correct values
    ✓ should emit MovingFundsParametersUpdated event
    ✓ should emit MovingFundsParametersUpdated event
  when new moving funds transaction max total fee is zero
    ✓ should revert
  when new moving funds dust threshold is zero
    ✓ should revert
  when new moving funds dust threshold is not lower than redemption dust threshold
    ✓ should revert
  when new moving funds timeout reset delay is zero
    ✓ should revert
  when new moving funds timeout is not greater than its reset delay
    ✓ should revert
  when new moved funds sweep timeout is zero
    ✓ should revert
  when new moved funds sweep timeout notifier reward multiplier is greater than 100
    ✓ should revert
when caller is not the contract guvnor
  ✓ should revert
updateWalletParameters
when caller is the contract guvnor
  when all new parameter values are correct
    ✓ should set correct values
    ✓ should emit WalletParametersUpdated event
    ✓ should emit WalletParametersUpdated event
  when new creation maximum BTC balance is not greater than the creation minimum BTC balance
    ✓ should revert
  when new maximum BTC transfer is zero
    ✓ should revert
  when new closing period is zero
    ✓ should revert
when caller is not the contract guvnor
  ✓ should revert
updateFraudParameters
when caller is the contract guvnor
  when all new parameter values are correct
    ✓ should set correct values
    ✓ should emit FraudParametersUpdated event
    ✓ should emit FraudParametersUpdated event
    ✓ should emit FraudParametersUpdated event
```

- ✓ should emit FraudParametersUpdated event
- when **new** fraud challenge defeat timeout is zero
 - ✓ should revert
- when **new** fraud notifier reward multiplier is greater than 100
 - ✓ should revert
- when caller is **not** the contract guvnor
 - ✓ should revert
- updateTreasury
 - when caller is the contract guvnor
 - when the **new** treasury address is non-zero
 - ✓ should set the **new** treasury address
 - ✓ should emit TreasuryUpdated event
 - when the **new** treasury address is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when caller is **not** the contract guvnor
 - ✓ should revert
- setRedemptionWatchtower
 - when caller is **not** the contract guvnor
 - ✓ should revert
 - when caller is the contract guvnor
 - when the watchtower address is already set
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the watchtower address is **not** set yet
 - when the watchtower address is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the watchtower address is non-zero
 - ✓ should set the watchtower address
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionWatchtowerSet event

Bridge – Redemption

- requestRedemption
 - when redemption watchtower is **not** set
 - when wallet state is Live
 - when there is a main UTXO for the given wallet
 - when main UTXO data are valid
 - when redeemer output script is standard type
 - when redeemer output script does **not** point to the wallet **public** key hash
 - when amount is **not** below the dust threshold
 - when there is no pending request for the given redemption key
 - when wallet has sufficient funds
 - when redeemer made a sufficient allowance in Bank
 - when redeemer output script is P2WPKH
 - ✓ should increase the wallet's pending redemptions value
 - ✓ should store the redemption request
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionRequested event
 - ✓ should take the right balance from Bank
 - when redeemer output script is P2WSH
 - ✓ should succeed
 - when redeemer output script is P2PKH
 - ✓ should succeed
 - when redeemer output script is P2SH
 - ✓ should succeed
 - when redemption treasury fee is zero
 - ✓ should store the redemption request with zero fee
 - when redeemer has **not** made a sufficient allowance in Bank
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet has insufficient funds
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there is a pending request for the given redemption key
 - ✓ should revert
 - when amount is below the dust threshold
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redeemer output script points to the wallet **public** key hash
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redeemer output script is **not** standard type
 - ✓ should revert
 - when main UTXO data are invalid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there is no main UTXO for the given wallet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is other than Live
 - when wallet state is Unknown


```
when the single output is an illegal P2SH change with a non-zero value
  ✓ should revert
when the single output is a change with a zero as value
  ✓ should revert
(node:4571) PromiseRejectionHandledWarning: Promise rejection was handled asynchronously (rejection id:
14)

when the single output is a non-requested redemption to an arbitrary script
  ✓ should revert
when the single output is provably unspendable OP_RETURN
  ✓ should revert
when there are multiple outputs
  when output vector consists only of pending requested redemptions
    ✓ should close processed redemption requests
    ✓ should delete the wallet's main UTXO
    ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
    ✓ should decrease the wallet's pending redemptions value
    ✓ should decrease Bridge's balance in Bank
    ✓ should not transfer anything to the treasury
    ✓ should not change redeemers balances in any way
  when output vector consists of pending requested redemptions and a non-zero change
    ✓ should close processed redemption requests
    ✓ should update the wallet's main UTXO
    ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
    ✓ should decrease the wallet's pending redemptions value
    ✓ should decrease Bridge's balance in Bank
    ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
    ✓ should not change redeemers balances in any way
  when output vector consists only of reported timed out requested redemptions
    ✓ should remove the timed out requests from the contract state
    ✓ should delete the wallet's main UTXO
    ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
    ✓ should not change the wallet's pending redemptions value
    ✓ should not change Bridge's balance in Bank
    ✓ should not transfer anything to the treasury
    ✓ should not change redeemers balances in any way
  when output vector consists of reported timed out requested redemptions and a non-
zero change
    ✓ should remove the timed out requests from the contract state
    ✓ should update the wallet's main UTXO
    ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
    ✓ should not change the wallet's pending redemptions value
    ✓ should not change Bridge's balance in Bank
    ✓ should not transfer anything to the treasury
    ✓ should not change redeemers balances in any way
  when output vector consists of pending requested redemptions and reported timed out
requested redemptions
    ✓ should remove the timed out requests from the contract state
    ✓ should close processed redemption requests
    ✓ should delete the wallet's main UTXO
    ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
    ✓ should decrease the wallet's pending redemptions value
    ✓ should decrease Bridge's balance in Bank
    ✓ should not transfer anything to the treasury
    ✓ should not change redeemers balances in any way
  when output vector consists of pending requested redemptions, reported timed out
requested redemptions and a non-zero change
    ✓ should remove the timed out requests from the contract state
    ✓ should close processed redemption requests
    ✓ should update the wallet's main UTXO
    ✓ should mark the previous main UTXO as spent
    ✓ should decrease the wallet's pending redemptions value
    ✓ should decrease Bridge's balance in Bank
    ✓ should transfer collected treasury fee
    ✓ should not change redeemers balances in any way
  when output vector contains a pending requested redemption with wrong amount
redeemed
    ✓ should revert
  when output vector contains a reported timed out requested redemption with wrong
amount redeemed
    ✓ should revert
  when output vector contains a non-zero P2SH change output
    ✓ should revert
```

- when output vector contains multiple non-zero change outputs
 - ✓ should revert
- when output vector contains one change but with zero as value
 - ✓ should revert
- when output vector contains a non-requested redemption to an arbitrary script hash
 - ✓ should revert
- when output vector contains a provably unspendable OP_RETURN output
 - ✓ should revert
- when the total transaction fee is too high
 - ✓ should revert
- when wallet state is MovingFunds
 - ✓ should succeed
- when wallet state is neither Live nor MovingFunds
 - when wallet state is Unknown
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closing
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Terminated
 - ✓ should revert
- when the single input doesn't point to the wallet's main UTXO
 - ✓ should revert
- when input count is other than one
 - ✓ should revert
- when main UTXO data are invalid
 - ✓ should revert
- when there is no main UTXO for the given wallet
 - ✓ should revert
- when transaction proof is **not** valid
 - when input vector is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when output vector is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction is **not** on same level of merkle tree as coinbase
 - ✓ should revert
 - when merkle proof is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when coinbase merkle proof is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when proof difficulty is **not** current nor previous
 - ✓ should revert
 - when headers chain length is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when headers chain is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the work in the header is insufficient
 - ✓ should revert
 - when accumulated difficulty in headers chain is insufficient
 - ✓ should revert

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of BridgeStub

You are using the `unsafeAllow.external-library-linking` flag to include external libraries. Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

- ✓ should revert
- when transaction data is limited to 64 bytes
 - ✓ should revert
- notifyRedemptionTimeout
 - when redemption request exists
 - when the redemption request has timed out
 - when the wallet is in Live state
 - when the wallet is the active wallet
 - ✓ should update the wallet's pending redemptions value
 - ✓ should **return** the requested amount of tokens to the redeemer
 - ✓ should remove the request from the pending redemptions
 - ✓ should **add** the request to the timed-out redemptions
 - ✓ should change the wallet's state to MovingFunds
 - ✓ should set the wallet's **move** funds requested timestamp
 - ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
 - ✓ should delete the active wallet **public** key hash
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimedOut event

- ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
- when the wallet is **not** the active wallet
 - ✓ should **not** delete the active wallet **public** key hash
- when the wallet is in MovingFunds state
 - ✓ should update the wallet's pending redemptions value
 - ✓ should **return** the requested amount of tokens to the redeemer
 - ✓ should remove the request from the pending redemptions
 - ✓ should **add** the request to the timed-out redemptions
 - ✓ should **not** change wallet state
 - ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimedOut event
- when the wallet is in Terminated state
 - ✓ should update the wallet's pending redemptions value
 - ✓ should remove the request from the pending redemptions
 - ✓ should **add** the request to the timed-out redemptions
 - ✓ should **not** change wallet state
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionTimedOut event
 - ✓ should **return** the requested amount of tokens to the redeemer
 - ✓ should **not** call the ECDSA wallet registry's seize function
- when the wallet is neither in Live, MovingFunds nor Terminated state
 - when wallet state is Unknown
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closing
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closed
 - ✓ should revert
- when the redemption request has **not** timed out
 - ✓ should revert
- when redemption request does **not** exist
 - ✓ should revert
- notifyRedemptionVeto
 - when the caller is **not** the redemption watchtower
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the redemption watchtower
 - when the redemption does **not** exist
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the redemption exists
 - ✓ should update the wallet's pending redemptions value
 - ✓ should remove the request from the pending redemptions
 - ✓ should transfer the requested amount of tokens to the watchtower

Bridge – Vaults

- isVaultTrusted
 - ✓ should **not** trust a vault by default
- setVaultStatus
 - when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the governance
 - when setting vault status as trusted
 - ✓ should correctly update vault status
 - ✓ should emit VaultStatusUpdated event
 - when setting vault status as no longer trusted
 - ✓ should correctly update vault status
 - ✓ should emit VaultStatusUpdated event

Bridge – Wallets

- requestNewWallet
 - when called by a third party
 - when wallet creation is **not** in progress
 - when active wallet is **not** set
 - ✓ should emit NewWalletRequested event
 - ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's requestNewWallet function
 - when active wallet is set
 - when active wallet has a main UTXO set
 - when the active wallet main UTXO data are valid
 - when wallet creation conditions are met
 - when active wallet is old enough **and** its balance is greater **or** equal the minimum BTC balance threshold
 - ✓ should emit NewWalletRequested event
 - ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's requestNewWallet function
 - when active wallet is **not** old enough but its balance is greater **or** equal the maximum

```
BTC balance threshold
    ✓ should emit NewWalletRequested event
    ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's requestNewWallet function
    when active wallet is not old enough and its balance is greater or equal the minimum but
    lesser than the maximum BTC balance threshold
    ✓ should revert
(node:4571) PromiseRejectionHandledWarning: Promise rejection was handled asynchronously (rejection id:
16)
    when active wallet is old enough but its balance is lesser than the minimum BTC balance
    threshold
    ✓ should revert
(node:4571) PromiseRejectionHandledWarning: Promise rejection was handled asynchronously (rejection id:
17)
    when the active wallet main UTXO data are invalid
    ✓ should revert
    when active wallet has no main UTXO set
    when the minimum BTC balance threshold is non-zero
    ✓ should revert
    when the minimum BTC balance threshold is non-zero
    ✓ should revert
    when the minimum BTC balance threshold is zero
    when wallet creation conditions are met
    ✓ should emit NewWalletRequested event
    ✓ should call ECDSA Wallet Registry's requestNewWallet function
    when wallet creation is already in progress
    when wallet creation state is AWAITING_SEED
    ✓ should revert
    when wallet creation state is AWAITING_RESULT
    ✓ should revert
    when wallet creation state is CHALLENGE
    ✓ should revert
__ecdsaWalletCreatedCallback
    when called by a third party
    ✓ should revert
    when called by the ECDSA Wallet Registry
    when called with a valid ECDSA Wallet details
    ✓ should register ECDSA wallet reference
    ✓ should transition wallet to Live state
    ✓ should set the created at timestamp
    ✓ should set the wallet as the active one
    ✓ should emit NewWalletRegistered event
    ✓ should increase the live wallets counter
    when called with the ECDSA Wallet already registered
    with unique wallet ID and unique public key
    ✓ should not revert
    with duplicated wallet ID and unique public key
    ✓ should not revert
    with unique wallet ID, unique public key X and duplicated public key Y
    ✓ should not revert
    with unique wallet ID, unique public key Y and duplicated public key X
    ✓ should not revert
    with unique wallet ID and duplicated public key
    ✓ should revert
    with duplicated wallet ID and duplicated public key
    ✓ should revert
__ecdsaWalletHeartbeatFailedCallback
    when called by the ECDSA Wallet Registry
    when wallet is in Live state
    when wallet balance is zero
    when wallet is the active one
    ✓ should change wallet's state to Closing
    ✓ should set the wallet's closing started timestamp
    ✓ should emit WalletClosing event
    ✓ should unset the active wallet
    ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
    when wallet is not the active one
    ✓ should change wallet's state to Closing
    ✓ should set the wallet's closing started timestamp
    ✓ should emit WalletClosing event
    ✓ should not unset the active wallet
    ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
    when wallet balance is greater than zero
```

```
when wallet is the active one
  ✓ should change wallet's state to MovingFunds
  ✓ should set move funds requested at timestamp
  ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
  ✓ should unset the active wallet
  ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
when wallet is not the active one
  ✓ should change wallet's state to MovingFunds
  ✓ should set move funds requested at timestamp
  ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
  ✓ should not unset the active wallet
  ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
when wallet is not in Live state
  when wallet state is Unknown
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is MovingFunds
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is Closing
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is Closed
    ✓ should revert
  when wallet state is Terminated
    ✓ should revert
when called by a third party
  ✓ should revert
notifyWalletCloseable
  when the reported wallet is not the active one
    when wallet is in Live state
      when wallet reached the maximum age
        when wallet balance is zero
          ✓ should change wallet's state to Closing
          ✓ should set the wallet's closing started timestamp
          ✓ should emit WalletClosing event
          ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
        when wallet balance is greater than zero
          ✓ should change wallet's state to MovingFunds
          ✓ should set move funds requested at timestamp
          ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
          ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
      when wallet did not reach the maximum age but their balance is lesser than the minimum
threshold
        when wallet balance is zero
          ✓ should change wallet's state to Closing
          ✓ should set the wallet's closing started timestamp
          ✓ should emit WalletClosing event
          ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
        when wallet balance is greater than zero
          ✓ should change wallet's state to MovingFunds
          ✓ should set move funds requested at timestamp
          ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
          ✓ should decrease the live wallets counter
      when wallet did not reach the maximum age and their balance is greater or equal the minimum
threshold
        ✓ should revert
      when wallet did not reach the maximum age and invalid main UTXO data is passed
        ✓ should revert
    when wallet is not in Live state
      when wallet state is Unknown
        ✓ should revert
      when wallet state is MovingFunds
        ✓ should revert
      when wallet state is Closing
        ✓ should revert
      when wallet state is Closed
        ✓ should revert
      when wallet state is Terminated
        ✓ should revert
  when the reported wallet is the active one
    ✓ should revert
notifyWalletClosingPeriodElapsed
  when the wallet is in the Closing state
    when closing period has elapsed
```

- ✓ should set wallet state to Closed
- ✓ should emit WalletClosed event
- ✓ should call the ECDSA wallet registry's closeWallet function when closing period has **not** elapsed yet
- ✓ should revert
- when the wallet is **not** in the Closing state
 - when wallet state is Unknown
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Live
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is MovingFunds
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Terminated
 - ✓ should revert

Deployment

Bridge

- ✓ should set Bridge proxy admin
- ✓ should set ProxyAdmin owner
- ✓ should set Bridge implementation
- ✓ should set Bridge implementation in ProxyAdmin
- ✓ should set implementation address different than proxy address
- ✓ should set Bridge governance
- ✓ should revert when initialize called again

BridgeGovernance

- ✓ should set owner

WalletRegistry

- ✓ should set walletOwner

Bank

- ✓ should set Bridge reference
- ✓ should set Bank owner

TBTCVault

- ✓ should set Bank reference
- ✓ should set TBTC reference
- ✓ should set TBTCVault owner

MaintainerProxy

- ✓ should set Bridge reference
- ✓ should set ReimbursementPool reference
- ✓ should set MaintainerProxy owner

ReimbursementPool

- ✓ should authorize MaintainerProxy in ReimbursementPool
- ✓ should set ReimbursementPool owner

VendingMachine

- ✓ should set vendingMachineUpgradeInitiator
- ✓ should set unmintFeeUpdateInitiator
- ✓ should set VendingMachine owner

EcdsaLib

compressPublicKey

- with valid uncompressed **public** key
 - ✓ with even Y
 - ✓ with odd Y
 - ✓ with leading zeros
 - ✓ with trailing zeros

Heartbeat

- when the message is empty
 - ✓ should **return** false
- when the message has less than 16 bytes
 - ✓ should **return** false
- when the message has more than 16 bytes
 - ✓ should **return** false
- when the message has 16 bytes
 - when the message does **not** have the required prefix
 - ✓ should **return** false
 - when the message has the required prefix
 - ✓ should **return** true

RedemptionWatchtower

enableWatchtower

- when called **not** by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when already enabled
 - ✓ should revert
 - when **not** enabled yet
 - when manager address is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when manager address is non-zero
 - ✓ should set the enabledAt timeout properly
 - ✓ should set the watchtower manager properly
 - ✓ should set initial guardians properly
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerEnabled event
 - ✓ should emit GuardianAdded events
- disableWatchtower
 - when the watchtower is **not** enabled
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the watchtower is enabled
 - when the watchtower is disabled already
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the watchtower is **not** disabled yet
 - when the watchtower lifetime is **not** expired
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the watchtower lifetime is expired
 - ✓ should set the disabledAt timeout properly
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerDisabled event
- addGuardian
 - when watchtower manager is **not** set
 - ✓ should revert
 - when watchtower manager is set
 - when called **not** by the watchtower manager
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the watchtower manager
 - when guardian already exists
 - ✓ should revert
 - when guardian does **not** exist
 - ✓ should **add** the guardian properly
 - ✓ should emit GuardianAdded event
- removeGuardian
 - when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the governance
 - when guardian does **not** exist
 - ✓ should revert
 - when guardian exists
 - ✓ should remove the guardian properly
 - ✓ should emit GuardianRemoved event
- raiseObjection
 - when called **not** by a guardian
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a guardian
 - when redemption request is already vetoed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redemption request is **not** vetoed yet
 - when guardian already objected
 - ✓ should revert
 - when guardian did **not** object yet
 - when redemption request does **not** exist
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redemption request exists
 - when the requested amount is below the waived amount limit
 - ✓ should revert
 - when watchtower has been disabled
 - ✓ should revert
 - when delay period expired **and** request was created after mechanism initialization
 - when the raised objection is the first one
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the raised objection is the second one
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the raised objection is the third one
 - ✓ should revert
 - when delay period expired but request was created before mechanism initialization

- when the raised objection is the first one
 - ✓ should emit VetoPeriodCheckOmitted event
 - ✓ should store the objection key
 - ✓ should update veto state properly
 - ✓ should emit ObjectionRaised event
- when the raised objection is the second one
 - ✓ should emit VetoPeriodCheckOmitted event
 - ✓ should store the objection key
 - ✓ should update veto state properly
 - ✓ should emit ObjectionRaised event
- when the raised objection is the third one
 - ✓ should emit VetoPeriodCheckOmitted event
 - ✓ should store the objection key
 - ✓ should update veto state properly
 - ✓ should emit ObjectionRaised event
 - ✓ should mark the redeemer as banned
 - ✓ should emit Banned event
 - ✓ should emit VetoFinalized event
 - ✓ should decrease wallet's pending redemptions value in the Bridge
 - ✓ should remove pending redemption in the Bridge
 - ✓ should transfer the redemption amount from the Bridge
 - ✓ should leave a proper withdrawable amount **and** burn the penalty fee
- when delay period did **not** expire yet
 - when the raised objection is the first one
 - ✓ should **not** emit VetoPeriodCheckOmitted event
 - ✓ should store the objection key
 - ✓ should update veto state properly
 - ✓ should emit ObjectionRaised event
 - when the raised objection is the second one
 - ✓ should **not** emit VetoPeriodCheckOmitted event
 - ✓ should store the objection key
 - ✓ should update veto state properly
 - ✓ should emit ObjectionRaised event
 - when the raised objection is the third one
 - ✓ should **not** emit VetoPeriodCheckOmitted event
 - ✓ should store the objection key
 - ✓ should update veto state properly
 - ✓ should emit ObjectionRaised event
 - ✓ should mark the redeemer as banned
 - ✓ should emit Banned event
 - ✓ should emit VetoFinalized event
 - ✓ should decrease wallet's pending redemptions value in the Bridge
 - ✓ should remove pending redemption in the Bridge
 - ✓ should transfer the redemption amount from the Bridge
 - ✓ should leave a proper withdrawable amount **and** burn the penalty fee
- getRedemptionDelay
 - when the redemption request does **not** exist
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the redemption request exists
 - when the watchtower has been disabled
 - ✓ should **return** zero as the delay
 - when the watchtower has **not** been disabled
 - when the requested amount is below the waived limit
 - ✓ should **return** zero as the delay
 - when the requested amount is **not** below the waived limit
 - when there are no objections
 - ✓ should **return** the default delay
 - when there is one objection
 - ✓ should **return** the level-one delay
 - when there are two objections
 - ✓ should **return** the level-two delay
 - when there are three objections
 - ✓ should revert
- updateWatchtowerParameters
 - when called **not** by the watchtower manager
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the watchtower manager
 - when **new** parameters are invalid
 - when the **new** lifetime is lesser than the current one
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the **new** veto penalty fee is **not** in the proper range
 - ✓ should revert

- when level-two delay is lesser than level-one delay
 - ✓ should revert
- when level-one delay is lesser than default delay
 - ✓ should revert
- when all **new** parameters are valid
 - when watchtower lifetime is increased
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when veto penalty is changed to to the maximum value of 5%
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when veto penalty is changed to to the middle of the range
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when veto penalty is changed to the minimum value of 0%
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when veto freeze period is changed to a non-zero value
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when veto freeze period is changed to 0
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when delays are changed to a non-zero value
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when delays are changed to 0
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
 - when waived amount limit is changed to a non-zero value
 - ✓ should emit WatchtowerParametersUpdated event
 - ✓ should update the watchtower parameters
- isSafeRedemption
 - when the balance owner is banned
 - ✓ should **return** false
 - when the redeemer is banned
 - ✓ should **return** false
 - when redemption key was vetoed
 - ✓ should **return** false
 - when redemption key was objected but **not** vetoed
 - ✓ should **return** false
 - when all safety criteria are met
 - ✓ should **return** true
- unban
 - when the caller is **not** the watchtower manager
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the watchtower manager
 - when the redeemer is **not** banned
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the redeemer is banned
 - ✓ should remove the redeemer from the banned list
 - ✓ should emit Unbanned event
- withdrawVetoedFunds
 - when the veto is **not** finalized
 - when there are no objections at all
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there some objections
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the veto is **finalized** **and** the penalty fee is lesser than 100%
 - when the caller is **not** the redeemer
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the redeemer
 - when the freeze period has **not** expired
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the freeze period has expired
 - when there are no funds to withdraw
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there are funds to withdraw
 - ✓ should emit VetoedFundsWithdrawn event
 - ✓ should set withdrawable amount to zero
 - ✓ should transfer the funds to the redeemer
 - when the veto is **finalized** **and** the penalty fee is 100%

- when the caller is **not** the redeemer
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the redeemer
 - when the freeze period has **not** expired
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the freeze period has expired
 - ✓ should revert

VendingMachine – Upgrade

- upgrade process – option #1
 - step#1 – TBTC v1 transfer
 - ✓ should transfer all TBTC v1 to TBTCVault
 - step#2 – TBTC v1 withdrawal
 - ✓ should let the governance withdraw TBTC v1 from TBTCVault
 - step#3 – BTC deposit
 - ✓ should let the governance donate TBTCVault
 - step#4 – functioning system
 - ✓ should let TBTC v2 holders unmint their tokens
 - ✓ should let Bank balance holders mint TBTC v2
- upgrade process – option #2
 - step#1 – TBTC v1 transfer
 - ✓ should transfer all TBTC v1 to TBTCVault
 - step#2 – TBTC v1 transfer back to VendingMachine
 - ✓ should let the governance transfer TBTC v1 back to VendingMachine
 - step #3 – BTC deposit
 - ✓ should let to deposit BTC into v2 Bridge
 - step #4 – TBTC v2 -> v2 unminting
 - ✓ should let the redeemer to unmint TBTC v2 back to TBTC v1

VendingMachine

- mint
 - when TBTC v1 owner has **not** enough tokens
 - ✓ should revert
 - when TBTC v1 owner has enough tokens
 - when minting entire allowance
 - ✓ should mint the same amount of TBTC v2
 - ✓ should transfer TBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachine
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
 - when minting part of the allowance
 - ✓ should mint the same amount of TBTC v2
 - ✓ should transfer TBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachine
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
- receiveApproval
 - when called directly
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called **not** for TBTC v1 token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called via approveAndCall
 - ✓ should mint TBTC v2 to the caller
 - ✓ should transfer TBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachine
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
- unmint
 - when unmint fee is zero
 - when TBTC v2 owner has **not** enough tokens
 - ✓ should revert
 - when TBTC v2 owner has enough tokens
 - when unminting entire TBTC v2 balance
 - ✓ should transfer no TBTC v2 to the VendingMachine
 - ✓ should burn unminted TBTC v2 tokens
 - ✓ should transfer unminted TBTC v1 tokens back to the owner
 - ✓ should emit the Unminted event
 - when unminting part of TBTC v2 balance
 - ✓ should transfer no TBTC v2 to the VendingMachine
 - ✓ should burn unminted TBTC v2 tokens
 - ✓ should transfer unminted TBTC v1 tokens back to the owner
 - ✓ should emit the Unminted event
 - when unmint fee is non-zero
 - when TBTC v2 owner has **not** enough tokens
 - ✓ should revert
 - when TBTC v2 owner has enough tokens
 - when unminting entire TBTC v2 balance
 - ✓ should transfer TBTC v2 fee to the VendingMachine

- ✓ should burn unminted TBTC v2 tokens
- ✓ should transfer unminted TBTC v1 tokens back to the owner
- ✓ should emit the Unminted event

when unminting part of TBTC v2 balance

- ✓ should transfer TBTC v2 fee to the VendingMachine
- ✓ should burn unminted TBTC v2 tokens
- ✓ should transfer unminted TBTC v1 tokens back to the owner
- ✓ should emit the Unminted event

withdrawFees

when caller is **not** the owner

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the owner

- ✓ should withdraw the provided amount of fees
- ✓ should leave the rest of fees in VendingMachine

initiateUnmintFeeUpdate

when caller is a third party

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the contract owner

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the update initiator

- ✓ should **not** update the unmint fee
- ✓ should start the update initiation time
- ✓ should set the pending **new** unmint fee
- ✓ should start the governance delay timer
- ✓ should emit UnmintFeeUpdateInitiated event

finalizeUnmintFeeUpdate

when caller is a third party

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the update initiator

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the owner

when update process is **not** initialized

- ✓ should revert

when update process is initialized

when governance delay has **not** passed

- ✓ should revert

when governance delay passed

- ✓ should update the unmint fee
- ✓ should emit UnmintFeeUpdated event
- ✓ should reset the governance delay timer
- ✓ should reset the pending **new** unmint fee
- ✓ should reset the unmint fee update initiated timestamp

initiateVendingMachineUpgrade

when caller is a third party

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the contract owner

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the upgrade initiator

when **new** vending machine address is zero

- ✓ should revert

when **new** vending machine address is non-zero

- ✓ should **not** transfer token ownership
- ✓ should start the upgrade initiation time
- ✓ should set the pending **new** vending machine address
- ✓ should start the governance delay timer
- ✓ should emit VendingMachineUpgradeInitiated event

finalizeVendingMachineUpgrade

when caller is a third party

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the upgrade initiator

- ✓ should revert

when caller is the owner

when upgrade process is **not** initialized

- ✓ should revert

when upgrade process is initialized

when governance delay has **not** passed

- ✓ should revert

when governance delay passed

- ✓ should transfer token ownership to the **new** VendingMachine
- ✓ should transfer all TBTC v1 to the **new** VendingMachine
- ✓ should emit VendingMachineUpgraded event
- ✓ should reset the governance delay timer

- ✓ should reset the pending `new` vending machine address
- ✓ should reset the vending machine update initiated timestamp

`transferUnmintFeeUpdateInitiatorRole`

- when caller is the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when caller is a third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when caller is the update initiator
 - when `new` initiator is a valid address
 - ✓ should transfer the role
 - when `new` initiator is zero address
 - ✓ should revert

`transferVendingMachineUpgradeInitiatorRole`

- when caller is the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when caller is a third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when caller is the update initiator
 - when `new` initiator is a valid address
 - ✓ should transfer the role
 - when `new` initiator is zero address
 - ✓ should revert

`unmintFeeFor`

- when unmint fee is non-zero
 - ✓ should `return` a correct portion of the amount to unmint
- when unmint fee is zero
 - ✓ should `return` zero

VendingMachineV2

`exchange`

- when tBTC v1 exchanger has `not` enough tokens
 - ✓ should revert
- when `not` enough tBTC v2 was deposited
 - ✓ should revert
- when exchanging entire allowance
 - ✓ should exchange the same amount of tBTC v2
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachineV2
 - ✓ should emit Exchanged event
- when exchanging part of the allowance
 - ✓ should exchange the same amount of tBTC v2
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachineV2
 - ✓ should emit Exchanged event

`receiveApproval`

- when called directly
 - ✓ should revert
- when called `not` for tBTC v1 token
 - ✓ should revert
- when called via `approveAndCall`
 - ✓ should exchange tBTC v2 with the caller
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachineV2
 - ✓ should emit Exchanged event

`depositTBTCV2`

- when depositing entire allowance
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v2 to the VendingMachineV2
 - ✓ should emit Deposited event
- when depositing part of the allowance
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v2 to the VendingMachineV2
 - ✓ should emit Deposited event

`withdrawFunds`

- when called by third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when withdrawing tBTC v1 tokens
 - ✓ should transfer tokens to the recipient
 - ✓ should emit Withdrawn event
 - when withdrawing tBTC v2 tokens
 - ✓ should transfer tokens to the recipient
 - ✓ should emit Withdrawn event

VendingMachineV3

`exchange`

- when tBTC v1 exchanger has `not` enough tokens

- ✓ should revert
- when `not` enough tBTC v2 was deposited
 - ✓ should revert
- when exchanging entire allowance
 - ✓ should exchange the same amount of tBTC v2
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachineV3
 - ✓ should emit Exchanged event
- when exchanging part of the allowance
 - ✓ should exchange the same amount of tBTC v2
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachineV3
 - ✓ should emit Exchanged event
- receiveApproval
 - when called directly
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called `not` for tBTC v1 token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called via `approveAndCall`
 - ✓ should exchange tBTC v2 with the caller
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v1 tokens to the VendingMachineV3
 - ✓ should emit Exchanged event
- depositTBTCV2
 - when depositing entire allowance
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v2 to the VendingMachineV3
 - ✓ should emit Deposited event
 - when depositing part of the allowance
 - ✓ should transfer tBTC v2 to the VendingMachineV3
 - ✓ should emit Deposited event
- recoverFunds
 - when called by third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - when recovering tBTC v1 tokens
 - ✓ should transfer tokens to the recipient
 - ✓ should emit FundsRecovered event
 - when recovering tBTC v2 tokens
 - ✓ should revert
 - when recovering other tokens
 - ✓ should transfer tokens to the recipient
 - ✓ should emit FundsRecovered event
- withdrawTbtcV2
 - when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - when some tBTC v1 would be unbacked
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all tBTC v1 would be still backed
 - ✓ should transfer tokens to the recipient
 - ✓ should emit TbtcV2Withdrawn event
- WalletProposalValidator
 - validateDepositSweepProposal
 - when wallet is incorrect state
 - when wallet state is Unknown
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closing
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Terminated
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet is correct state
 - when wallet state is Live
 - when sweep is below the min size
 - ✓ should revert
 - when sweep is above the min size
 - when sweep exceeds the max size
 - ✓ should revert
 - when sweep does `not` exceed the max size
 - when deposit extra info length does `not` match
 - ✓ should revert
 - when deposit extra info length matches
 - when proposed sweep tx fee is invalid

- ✓ should revert
 - when all deposits are controlled by the same wallet
 - when there is a deposit targeting a different vault
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all deposits targets the same vault
 - when there are duplicated deposits
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all deposits are unique
 - ✓ should succeed
- validateRedemptionProposal
 - when wallet is in incorrect state
 - when wallet state is Unknown
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closing
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Closed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet state is Terminated
 - ✓ should revert
 - when wallet is in correct state
 - when wallet state is Live
 - when redemption is below the min size
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redemption is above the min size
 - when redemption exceeds the max size
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redemption does **not** exceed the max size
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is invalid
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is greater than the allowed total fee
 - ✓ should revert
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is valid
 - when there is a non-pending request
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all requests are pending
 - when there is an immature request
 - when immaturity is caused by REDEMPTION_REQUEST_MIN_AGE violation
 - ✓ should revert
 - when immaturity is caused by watchtower's delay violation
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all requests achieved the min age
 - when there is a request that violates the timeout safety margin
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all requests preserve the timeout safety margin
 - when there is a request that incurs an unacceptable tx fee share
 - when there is no fee remainder
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there is a fee remainder
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all requests incur an acceptable tx fee share
 - when there are duplicated requests
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all requests are unique
 - when watchtower is **not** set
 - ✓ should succeed
 - when watchtower is set
 - ✓ should succeed
 - when wallet state is MovingFunds
 - when redemption is below the min size
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redemption is above the min size
 - when redemption exceeds the max size
 - ✓ should revert
 - when redemption does **not** exceed the max size
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is invalid
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is greater than the allowed total fee
 - ✓ should revert
 - when proposed redemption tx fee is valid
 - when there is a non-pending request

```
    ✓ should revert
  when all requests are pending
    when there is an immature request
      when immaturity is caused by REDEMPTION_REQUEST_MIN_AGE violation
        ✓ should revert
      when immaturity is caused by watchtower's delay violation
        ✓ should revert
    when all requests achieved the min age
      when there is a request that violates the timeout safety margin
        ✓ should revert
      when all requests preserve the timeout safety margin
        when there is a request that incurs an unacceptable tx fee share
          when there is no fee remainder
            ✓ should revert
          when there is a fee remainder
            ✓ should revert
        when all requests incur an acceptable tx fee share
          when there are duplicated requests
            ✓ should revert
          when all requests are unique
            when watchtower is not set
              ✓ should succeed
            when watchtower is set
              ✓ should succeed
validateMovingFundsProposal
  when wallet's state is not MovingFunds
    when wallet state is Unknown
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Live
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Closing
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Closed
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Terminated
      ✓ should revert
  when wallet's state is MovingFunds
    when moving funds commitment has not been submitted
      ✓ should revert
    when moving funds commitment has been submitted
      when commitment hash does not match target wallets
        ✓ should revert
      when commitment hash matches target wallets
        when no main UTXO is passed
          ✓ should revert
        when the passed main UTXO is incorrect
          ✓ should revert
        when the passed main UTXO is correct
          when source wallet BTC balance is below dust threshold
            ✓ should revert
          when source wallet BTC balance is equal to or greater than dust threshold
            when transaction fee is zero
              ✓ should revert
            when transaction fee is too high
              ✓ should revert
            when transaction fee is valid
              ✓ should pass validation
validateMovedFundsSweepProposal
  when wallet's state is incorrect
    when wallet state is Unknown
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Closing
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Closed
      ✓ should revert
    when wallet state is Terminated
      ✓ should revert
  when wallet's state is correct
    when wallet state is Live
      when moved funds sweep request's state is not Pending
        ✓ should revert
      when moved funds sweep request's state is Pending
```

- when moved funds sweep request does **not** belong to the wallet
 - ✓ should revert
- when moved funds sweep request belongs to the wallet
 - when transaction fee is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction fee is too high
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction fee is valid
 - ✓ should pass validation
- when wallet state is MovingFunds
 - when moved funds sweep request's state is **not** Pending
 - ✓ should revert
 - when moved funds sweep request's state is Pending
 - when moved funds sweep request does **not** belong to the wallet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when moved funds sweep request belongs to the wallet
 - when transaction fee is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction fee is too high
 - ✓ should revert
 - when transaction fee is valid
 - ✓ should pass validation
- validateHeartbeatProposal
 - when message is **not** valid
 - ✓ should revert
 - when message is valid
 - ✓ should succeed

Integration Test – Full flow

- Check deposit **and** redemption flow
 - when wallet is created
 - when a deposit is revealed
 - should create a deposit
 - when the deposit sweep proof is submitted
 - should mint TBTC tokens for the depositor
 - should increase the balance of vault in the bank
 - should update the main UTXO of the wallet
 - when a redemption is requested
 - should create a pending redemption request
 - should increase the pending redemptions value of the wallet
 - should increase the balance of **bridge** in the bank
 - when the redemption proof is submitted
 - should zero the pending redemptions value of the wallet
 - should zero the balance of **bridge** in the bank
 - should update the main UTXO of the wallet

Integration Test – Slashing

- notifyFraudChallengeDefeatTimeout
 - when wallet is created
 - when a fraud is reported
 - should slash wallet members
 - should close the wallet in the wallet registry
 - should terminate the wallet in the **bridge**
 - should consume around 3 100 000 gas for Bridge.notifyMovingFundsTimeoutTx transaction
- notifyRedemptionTimeout
 - when wallet is created
 - when a redemption timeout is reported
 - should slash wallet members
 - should **not** close the wallet in the wallet registry
 - should transition the wallet in the **bridge** to the MovingFunds state
 - should consume around 3 150 000 gas for Bridge.notifyRedemptionTimeout transaction
- notifyMovingFundsTimeout
 - when wallet is created
 - when moving funds timeout is reported
 - should slash wallet members
 - should close the wallet in the wallet registry
 - should terminate the wallet in the **bridge**
 - should consume around 3 100 000 gas for Bridge.notifyMovingFundsTimeoutTx transaction

Integration Test – Wallet Creation

- new** wallet creation (happy path)
 - should register a **new** wallet in the WalletRegistry

- should register a **new** wallet details in the Bridge
- should register a **new** wallet as active in the Bridge
- should consume around 94 000 gas for Bridge.requestNewWallet transaction
- should consume around 341 000 gas for WalletRegistry.approveDkgResult transaction

AbstractTBTCDepositor

- _initializeDeposit
 - when revealed vault does **not** match
 - ✓ should revert
 - when revealed vault matches
 - when deposit is rejected by the Bridge
 - ✓ should revert
 - when deposit is accepted by the Bridge
 - ✓ should reveal the deposit to the Bridge
 - ✓ should **return** proper values
- _finalizeDeposit
 - when deposit is **not** initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when deposit is already **finalized**
 - ✓ should **not** revert
 - when deposit is initialized but **not** finalized yet
 - when deposit is **not** finalized by the Bridge
 - ✓ should revert
 - when deposit is **finalized** by the Bridge
 - when the deposit is swept
 - ✓ should **return** proper values
 - when the deposit is optimistically minted
 - ✓ should **return** proper values
- _calculateTbtcAmount
 - when all fees are non-zero
 - ✓ should **return** the correct amount
 - when all fees are zero
 - ✓ should **return** the correct amount
 - when one of the fees is zero
 - when treasury fee is zero
 - ✓ should **return** the correct amount
 - when optimistic minting fee is zero
 - ✓ should **return** the correct amount
 - when transaction max fee is zero
 - ✓ should **return** the correct amount
- _minDepositAmount
 - ✓ returns value in TBTC token precision

L1BitcoinDepositor

- attachL2BitcoinDepositor
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - when the L2BitcoinDepositor is already attached
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the L2BitcoinDepositor is **not** attached
 - when **new** L2BitcoinDepositor is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when **new** L2BitcoinDepositor is non-zero
 - ✓ should set the l2BitcoinDepositor address properly
- updateReimbursementPool
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should set the reimbursementPool address properly
 - ✓ should emit ReimbursementPoolUpdated event
- updateL2FinalizeDepositGasLimit
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should set the gas limit properly
 - ✓ should emit L2FinalizeDepositGasLimitUpdated event
- updateGasOffsetParameters
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should set the gas offset params properly

- ✓ should emit GasOffsetParametersUpdated event

updateReimbursementAuthorization

- when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should set the authorization properly
 - ✓ should emit ReimbursementAuthorizationUpdated event

initializeDeposit

- when the L2 deposit owner is zero
 - ✓ should revert
- when the L2 deposit owner is non-zero
 - when the requested vault is **not** TBTCVault
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the requested vault is TBTCVault
 - when the deposit state is wrong
 - when the deposit state is Initialized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit state is Finalized
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit state is Unknown
 - when the reimbursement pool is **not** set
 - ✓ should reveal the deposit to the Bridge
 - ✓ should set the deposit state to Initialized
 - ✓ should emit DepositInitialized event
 - ✓ should **not** store the deferred gas reimbursement
 - when the reimbursement pool is set **and** caller is authorized
 - ✓ should reveal the deposit to the Bridge
 - ✓ should set the deposit state to Initialized
 - ✓ should emit DepositInitialized event
 - ✓ should store the deferred gas reimbursement
 - when the reimbursement pool is set **and** caller is **not** authorized
 - ✓ should reveal the deposit to the Bridge
 - ✓ should set the deposit state to Initialized
 - ✓ should emit DepositInitialized event
 - ✓ should **not** store the deferred gas reimbursement

finalizeDeposit

- when the deposit state is wrong
 - when the deposit state is Unknown
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit state is Finalized
 - ✓ should revert
- when the deposit state is Initialized
 - when the deposit is **not** finalized by the Bridge
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit is **finalized** by the Bridge
 - when normalized amount is too low to **bridge**
 - ✓ should revert
 - when normalized amount is **not** too low to **bridge**
 - when payment for Wormhole Relayer is too low
 - ✓ should revert
 - when payment for Wormhole Relayer is **not** too low
 - when the reimbursement pool is **not** set
 - ✓ should set the deposit state to Finalized
 - ✓ should emit DepositFinalized event
 - ✓ should increase TBTC allowance for Wormhole Token Bridge
 - ✓ should create a proper Wormhole token transfer
 - ✓ should send transfer VAA to L2
 - ✓ should **not** call the reimbursement pool
 - when the reimbursement pool is set **and** caller is authorized
 - ✓ should set the deposit state to Finalized
 - ✓ should emit DepositFinalized event
 - ✓ should increase TBTC allowance for Wormhole Token Bridge
 - ✓ should create a proper Wormhole token transfer
 - ✓ should send transfer VAA to L2
 - ✓ should pay out proper reimbursements
 - when the reimbursement pool is set **and** caller is **not** authorized
 - ✓ should set the deposit state to Finalized
 - ✓ should emit DepositFinalized event
 - ✓ should increase TBTC allowance for Wormhole Token Bridge
 - ✓ should create a proper Wormhole token transfer
 - ✓ should send transfer VAA to L2
 - ✓ should pay out proper reimbursements

quoteFinalizeDeposit

- ✓ should `return` the correct cost

L2BitcoinDepositor

attachL1BitcoinDepositor

- when the caller is `not` the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the owner
 - when the L1BitcoinDepositor is already attached
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the L1BitcoinDepositor is `not` attached
 - when `new` L1BitcoinDepositor is zero
 - ✓ should revert
 - when `new` L1BitcoinDepositor is non-zero
 - ✓ should set the l1BitcoinDepositor address properly

initializeDeposit

- ✓ should emit DepositInitialized event

receiveWormholeMessages

- when the caller is `not` the WormholeRelayer
 - ✓ should revert
- when the caller is the WormholeRelayer
 - when the source chain is `not` the expected L1
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source chain is the expected L1
 - when the source address is `not` the L1BitcoinDepositor
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the source address is the L1BitcoinDepositor
 - when the number of additional VAAs is `not` 1
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the number of additional VAAs is 1
 - ✓ should pass the VAA to the L2WormholeGateway

L2TBTC

- ✓ should have a name
- ✓ should have a symbol
- ✓ should have 18 decimals

addMinter

- when called `not` by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when address is a `new` minter
 - ✓ should `add` address as a minter
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when address is already a minter
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there are multiple minters
 - ✓ should `add` them into the list

removeMinter

- when called `not` by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when address is `not` a minter
 - ✓ should revert
 - when a minter address is removed
 - ✓ should take minter role from the address
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when there are multiple minters
 - when deleting the first minter
 - ✓ should update the minters list
 - when deleting the last minter
 - ✓ should update the minters list
 - when deleting minter from the middle of the list
 - ✓ should update the minters list

addGuardian

- when called `not` by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when address is a `new` guardian
 - ✓ should `add` address as a guardian
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when address is already a guardian
 - ✓ should revert

- when there are multiple guardians
 - ✓ should **add** them into the list
- removeGuardian
 - when called **not** by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - when address is **not** a guardian
 - ✓ should revert
 - when a guardian address is removed
 - ✓ should take guardian role from the address
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when there are multiple guardians
 - when deleting the first guardian
 - ✓ should update the guardians list
 - when deleting the last guardian
 - ✓ should update the guardians list
 - when deleting guardian from the middle of the list
 - ✓ should update the guardians list
 - recoverERC20
 - when called **not** by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the contract owner
 - ✓ should transfer tokens to the recipient
 - recoverERC721
 - when called **not** by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - ✓ transfers token to the recipient
 - pause
 - when called **not** by a guardian
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a guardian
 - ✓ should emit Paused event
 - ✓ should pause mint functionality
 - ✓ should pause burn functionality
 - ✓ should pause burnFrom functionality
 - ✓ should **not** pause transfers
 - unpause
 - when called **not** by the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - ✓ should emit Unpaused event
 - ✓ should unpause mint functionality
 - ✓ should unpause burn functionality
 - ✓ should unpause burnFrom functionality
 - mint
 - when called **not** by a minter
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a minter
 - for a zero account
 - ✓ should revert
 - for a non-zero account
 - ✓ should increment totalSupply
 - ✓ should increment recipient balance
 - ✓ should emit Transfer event
 - totalSupply
 - ✓ should **return** the total amount of tokens
 - DOMAIN_SEPARATOR
 - ✓ should be keccak256 of EIP712 domain struct
 - balanceOf
 - ✓ should **return** the total amount of tokens
 - transfer
 - ✓ should transfer the requested amount
 - ✓ should emit a transfer event
 - transferFrom
 - ✓ should transfer the requested amount
 - ✓ should emit a transfer event
 - approve
 - ✓ should approve the requested amount
 - ✓ should emit an approval event
 - burn
 - ✓ should decrement account's balance

- ✓ should emit Transfer event
- burnFrom
- ✓ should decrement account's balance
 - ✓ should decrement allowance
 - ✓ should emit Transfer event
- permit
- ✓ should emit an approval event
 - ✓ should approve the requested amount

L2WormholeGateway

initialization

- ✓ should set the wormhole **bridge** address
- ✓ should set the wormhole **bridge** token address
- ✓ should set the canonical tBTC address

receiveTbtc

when receiver is the zero address

- ✓ should revert

when the transferred amount is zero

- ✓ should revert

when receiver is non-zero address

when the minting limit was **not** reached

- ✓ should transfer wormhole tBTC to the contract
- ✓ should mint tBTC to the receiver
- ✓ should complete transfer with the **bridge**
- ✓ should emit the WormholeTbtcReceived event
- ✓ should increase the minted amount counter

when the minting limit was reached

- ✓ should transfer wormhole tBTC to the contract
- ✓ should mint tBTC to the receiver before reaching the minting limit
- ✓ should send wormhole tBTC to the receiver after reaching the minting limit
- ✓ should increase the minted amount counter

sendTbtc

when there is **not** enough wormhole tBTC

- ✓ should revert

when there is enough wormhole tBTC

when the receiver address is zero

- ✓ should revert

when the amount is zero

- ✓ should revert

when the receiver address **and** amount are non-zero

when the target chain has no tBTC gateway

- ✓ should burn canonical tBTC from the caller
- ✓ should approve burned amount of wormhole tBTC to the **bridge**
- ✓ should sent tokens through the **bridge**
- ✓ should emit the WormholeTbtcSent event

when the target chain has a tBTC gateway

- ✓ should burn canonical tBTC from the caller
- ✓ should approve burned amount of wormhole tBTC to the **bridge**
- ✓ should sent tokens through the **bridge**
- ✓ should emit the WormholeTbtcSent event

when the amount is below dust

- ✓ should revert

when the amount is just above the dust

- ✓ should burn canonical tBTC from the caller
- ✓ should approve burned amount of wormhole tBTC to the **bridge**
- ✓ should sent the entire amount through the **bridge**

when the amount has a small dust

- ✓ should burn canonical tBTC from the caller after dropping dust
- ✓ should approve burned amount of wormhole tBTC to the **bridge** after dropping dust
- ✓ should drop the dust before sending over the **bridge**

when the amount has a lot of dust

- ✓ should burn canonical tBTC from the caller after dropping dust
- ✓ should approve burned amount of wormhole tBTC to the **bridge** after dropping dust
- ✓ should drop the dust before sending over the **bridge**

updateGatewayAddress

when called by a third party

- ✓ should revert

when called by the governance

- ✓ should update the gateway address
- ✓ should emit the GatewayAddressUpdated event

when disabling gateway

- ✓ should update the gateway address

- ✓ should emit the GatewayAddressUpdated event

updateMintingLimit

- when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - ✓ should update the minting limit
 - ✓ should emit the MintingLimitUpdated event

toWormholeAddress

- ✓ should convert Ethereum address into Wormhole format

fromWormholeAddress

- ✓ should convert Wormhole address into Ethereum format

MaintainerProxy

requestNewWallet

- when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by an SPV maintainer that is **not** wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by a wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should emit NewWalletRequested event
 - ✓ should refund ETH

submitDepositSweepProof

- when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by a wallet maintainer that is **not** SPV maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by an SPV maintainer
 - when there is only one input
 - when the single input is a revealed unswept P2SH deposit
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the single input is a revealed unswept P2WSH deposit
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the single input is a revealed unswept deposit with a trusted vault
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the single input is a revealed unswept deposit with a non-trusted vault
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when there are multiple inputs
 - when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits **and** the expected main UTXO
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits with a trusted vault **and** the expected main UTXO
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits with a non-trusted vault **and** the expected main UTXO
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits with different trusted vaults **and** the expected main UTXO
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when input vector consists only of revealed unswept deposits but there is no main UTXO since it is **not** expected
 - ✓ should emit DepositSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH

submitRedemptionProof

- when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by a wallet maintainer that is **not** SPV maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by an SPV maintainer
 - when there is only one output
 - when the single output is a pending requested redemption
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the single output is a non-reported timed out requested redemption
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event

- ✓ should refund ETH
- when the single output is a reported timed out requested redemption
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- when there are multiple outputs
 - when output vector consists only of pending requested redemptions
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when output vector consists of pending requested redemptions **and** a non-zero change
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when output vector consists only of reported timed out requested redemptions
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when output vector consists of reported timed out requested redemptions **and** a non-zero change
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when output vector consists of pending requested redemptions **and** reported timed out requested redemptions
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when output vector consists of pending requested redemptions, reported timed out requested redemptions **and** a non-zero change
 - ✓ should emit RedemptionsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- notifyWalletCloseable
 - when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by an SPV maintainer that is **not** wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a wallet maintainer
 - when wallet reached the maximum age
 - when wallet balance is zero
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosing event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when wallet balance is greater than zero
 - ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when wallet did **not** reach the maximum age but their balance is lesser than the minimum threshold
 - when wallet balance is zero
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosing event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when wallet balance is greater than zero
 - ✓ should emit WalletMovingFunds event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- defeatFraudChallenge
 - when the input is non-witness
 - when the transaction has single input
 - when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the transaction has multiple inputs
 - when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the input is witness
 - when the transaction has single input
 - when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the transaction has multiple inputs
 - when the input is marked as correctly spent in the Bridge
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- defeatFraudChallengeWithHeartbeat
 - ✓ should emit FraudChallengeDefeated event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- submitMovingFundsProof
 - when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a wallet maintainer that is **not** SPV maintainer
 - ✓ should revert

- when called by an SPV maintainer
 - when there is a single target wallet
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when there are multiple target wallets **and** the amount is indivisible
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when there are multiple target wallets **and** the amount is divisible
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsCompleted event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- resetMovingFundsTimeout
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsTimeoutReset event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- notifyMovingFundsBelowDust
 - when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by an SPV maintainer that is **not** wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should emit MovingFundsBelowDustReported event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- submitMovedFundsSweepProof
 - when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a wallet maintainer that is **not** SPV maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by an SPV maintainer
 - when the sweeping wallet has no main UTXO set
 - when there is a single input referring to a Pending sweep request
 - ✓ should emit MovedFundsSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the sweeping wallet has a main UTXO set
 - when the first input refers to a Pending sweep request **and** the second input refers to the sweeping wallet main UTXO
 - ✓ should emit MovedFundsSwept event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- notifyWalletClosingPeriodElapsed
 - when called by an unauthorized third party
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by an SPV maintainer that is **not** wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a wallet maintainer
 - ✓ should emit WalletClosed event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
- authorizeWalletMaintainer
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should be already populated with the authorized maintainer
 - ✓ should authorize a thirdParty
 - ✓ should be total of 2 authorized maintainers
 - ✓ should **add** a thirdParty to a maintainers list
 - ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerAuthorized event
- authorizeSpvMaintainer
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should be already populated with the authorized maintainer
 - ✓ should authorize a thirdParty
 - ✓ should be total of 2 authorized maintainers
 - ✓ should **add** a thirdParty to a maintainers list
 - ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerAuthorized event
- unauthorizeWalletMaintainer
 - when the caller is **not** the owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the caller is the owner
 - ✓ should be a total of 0 authorized maintainers
 - when there are no authorized maintainers
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there are authorized maintainers
 - when maintainer to unauthorize is **not** among the authorized maintainers
 - ✓ should revert

```
when there is one authorized maintainer
  when unauthorizing the one that is authorized
    ✓ should unauthorize the maintainer
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
when there are many authorized maintainers
  when unauthorizing a couple of maintainers from the beginning
    ✓ should unauthorize the maintainer
    ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
    ✓ should unauthorize the other maintainer
    ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
    ✓ should remove 2 maintainers from the maintainers array
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
  when unauthorizing a couple of maintainers from the middle
    ✓ should unauthorize a maintainer
    ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
    ✓ should unauthorize the other maintainer
    ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
    ✓ should remove 2 maintainers from the maintainers array
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
  when unauthorizing a couple of maintainers from the end
    ✓ should unauthorize a maintainer
    ✓ should unauthorize the other maintainer
    ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
    ✓ should remove 2 maintainers from the maintainers array
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
    ✓ should emit a WalletMaintainerUnauthorized event
unauthorizeSpvMaintainer
  when the caller is not the owner
    ✓ should revert
  when the caller is the owner
    ✓ should be a total of 0 authorized maintainers
  when there are no authorized maintainers
    ✓ should revert
  when there are authorized maintainers
    when maintainer to unauthorize is not among the authorized maintainers
      ✓ should revert
  when there is one authorized maintainer
    when unauthorizing the one that is authorized
      ✓ should unauthorize the maintainer
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
  when there are many authorized maintainers
    when unauthorizing a couple of maintainers from the beginning
      ✓ should unauthorize the maintainer
      ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
      ✓ should unauthorize the other maintainer
      ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
      ✓ should remove 2 maintainers from the maintainers array
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
    when unauthorizing a couple of maintainers from the middle
      ✓ should unauthorize a maintainer
      ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
      ✓ should unauthorize the other maintainer
      ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
      ✓ should remove 2 maintainers from the maintainers array
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
    when unauthorizing a couple of maintainers from the end
      ✓ should unauthorize a maintainer
      ✓ should unauthorize the other maintainer
      ✓ should change the last maintainer's index with the unauthorized one
      ✓ should remove 2 maintainers from the maintainers array
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
      ✓ should emit an SpvMaintainerUnauthorized event
updateBridge
  when called by a third party
    ✓ should revert
  when called by the owner
    ✓ should update the bridge
    ✓ should emit the BridgeUpdated event
```

updateGasOffsetParameters

when called by a third party

- ✓ should revert

when called by the owner

- ✓ should emit the GasOffsetParametersUpdated event
- ✓ should update submitRedemptionProofGasOffset
- ✓ should update resetMovingFundsTimeoutGasOffset
- ✓ should update submitMovingFundsProofGasOffset
- ✓ should update notifyMovingFundsBelowDustGasOffset
- ✓ should update submitMovedFundsSweepProofGasOffset
- ✓ should update requestNewWalletGasOffset
- ✓ should update notifyWalletCloseableGasOffset
- ✓ should update notifyWalletClosingPeriodElapsedGasOffset
- ✓ should update defeatFraudChallengeGasOffset
- ✓ should update defeatFraudChallengeWithHeartbeatGasOffset

updateReimbursementPool

when called by a third party

- ✓ should revert

when called by the owner

- ✓ should emit the ReimbursementPoolUpdated event

LightRelay

genesis

when called with valid inputs

- ✓ should record the relay as ready for use
- ✓ should emit the Genesis event
- ✓ should record the genesis epoch difficulty correctly

when called with invalid block height

- ✓ should revert

when called with invalid header data

- ✓ should revert

when called with excessive proof length

- ✓ should revert

when called with zero proof length

- ✓ should revert

when called by anyone other than governance

- ✓ should revert

when called more than once

- ✓ should revert

setProofLength

before genesis

- ✓ should revert

after genesis

when called correctly

- ✓ should store the **new** proof length
- ✓ should emit the ProofLengthChanged event

when called with excessive proof length

- ✓ should revert

when called with zero proof length

- ✓ should revert

when called with unchanged proof length

- ✓ should revert

when called by anyone other than governance

- ✓ should revert

authorizations

authorization status

- ✓ should start at false

when set by governance

- ✓ should be updated
- ✓ should emit an event

when set by someone other than governance

- ✓ should revert

when unset by governance

- ✓ should be updated
- ✓ should emit an event

submitter authorization

- ✓ should start at false

when set by governance

- ✓ should be updated
- ✓ should emit an event

when set by someone other than governance

- ✓ should revert

- when unset by governance
 - ✓ should be updated
 - ✓ should emit an event
- retarget
 - when called before genesis
 - ✓ should revert
 - after genesis (epoch 274)
 - when called correctly
 - ✓ should store the **new** difficulty
 - ✓ should emit the Retarget event
 - with incorrect number of headers
 - ✓ should revert
 - with too few headers before retarget
 - ✓ should revert
 - with too few headers after retarget
 - ✓ should revert
 - with proof length 9
 - ✓ should store the **new** difficulty
 - ✓ should emit the Retarget event
 - with appropriate authorisation
 - ✓ should store the **new** difficulty
 - ✓ should emit the Retarget event
 - without appropriate authorisation
 - ✓ should revert
 - after genesis (invalid)
 - ✓ should reject chains with invalid difficulty
 - after genesis (long chain)
 - with proof length 6
 - ✓ should store the **new** difficulty
 - ✓ should emit the Retarget event
 - with proof length 50
 - ✓ should store the **new** difficulty
 - ✓ should emit the Retarget event
- validateChain
 - when called before genesis
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called after genesis (epoch 274)
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains
 - ✓ should accept short header chains
 - ✓ should accept **long** header chains
 - ✓ should reject single headers
 - ✓ should reject header chains with an unknown retarget
 - ✓ should reject header chains in a future epoch
 - when called after genesis (epoch 275)
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains
 - ✓ should reject header chains partially in a past epoch
 - ✓ should reject header chains fully in a past epoch
 - when called after a retarget
 - in the genesis epoch
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains
 - over the retarget
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains (3 before, 1 after)
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains (2 before, 2 after)
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains (1 before, 3 after)
 - in the **new** epoch
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains
 - with chain reorgs
 - valid chains
 - ✓ should be accepted
 - invalid chains
 - ✓ should be rejected
 - gas costs
 - with proof length 6
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains
 - with proof length 18
 - ✓ should accept valid header chains
- getBlockDifficulty
 - when called before genesis
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called after genesis
 - ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the first block of the epoch
 - ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the last block of the epoch

- ✓ should revert for blocks before genesis
- ✓ should revert for blocks after the latest epoch

when called after a retarget

- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the first block of the genesis epoch
- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the last block of the genesis epoch
- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the first block of the next epoch
- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the last block of the next epoch
- ✓ should revert for blocks before genesis
- ✓ should revert for blocks after the latest epoch

getEpochDifficulty

when called before genesis

- ✓ should revert

when called after genesis

- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the genesis epoch
- ✓ should revert for epochs before genesis
- ✓ should revert for unproven epochs

when called after a retarget

- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the genesis epoch
- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the next epoch
- ✓ should revert for epochs before genesis
- ✓ should revert for unproven epochs

getRelayRange

when called before genesis

- ✓ should **return** nonsense

when called after genesis

- ✓ should **return** a single epoch

when called after a retarget

- ✓ should **return** two epochs

getCurrentEpochDifficulty

when called before genesis

- ✓ should **return** zero

when called after genesis

- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the genesis epoch

when called after a retarget

- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the next epoch

getPrevEpochDifficulty

when called before genesis

- ✓ should **return** zero

when called after genesis

- ✓ should **return** zero

when called after a retarget

- ✓ should **return** the difficulty for the genesis epoch

getCurrentAndPrevEpochDifficulty

when called before genesis

- ✓ should **return** zero for both

when called after genesis

- ✓ should **return** current difficulty, **and** zero for previous

when called after a retarget

- ✓ should **return** current **and** previous difficulty

LightRelayMaintainerProxy

authorize

when called by non-owner

- ✓ should revert

when called by the owner

when the maintainer is already authorized

- ✓ should revert

when the maintainer is **not** authorized yet

- ✓ should authorize the address
- ✓ should emit the MaintainerAuthorized event

deauthorize

when called by non-owner

- ✓ should revert

when called by the owner

when the maintainer is **not** authorized

- ✓ should revert

when the maintainer is authorized

- ✓ should deauthorize the address
- ✓ should emit the MaintainerDeauthorized event

updateLightRelay

when called by non-owner

- ✓ should revert

- when called by the owner
 - when called with zero address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called with a non-zero address
 - ✓ should update the light relay address
 - ✓ should emit the LightRelayUpdated event
- updateReimbursementPool
 - when called by non-owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - ✓ should emit the ReimbursementPoolUpdated event
- updateRetargetGasOffset
 - when called by non-owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the owner
 - ✓ should emit the RetargetGasOffsetUpdated event
 - ✓ should update retargetGasOffset
- retarget
 - when called by an unauthorized address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by an authorized maintainer
 - when the proof length is 10 headers
 - ✓ should emit Retarget event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the proof length is 20 headers
 - ✓ should emit Retarget event
 - ✓ should refund ETH
 - when the proof length is 50 headers
 - ✓ should emit Retarget event
 - ✓ should refund ETH

DonationVault

constructor

- when called with a 0-address bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should set the Bank field

donate

- when caller has **not** enough balance in the bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when vault does **not** have enough allowance for caller's balance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should decrease donor's balance
 - ✓ should **not** increase vault's balance
 - ✓ should emit BalanceDecreased event
 - ✓ should emit DonationReceived event

receiveBalanceApproval

- when called **not** by the bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when caller has **not** enough balance in the bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should decrease donor's balance
 - ✓ should **not** increase vault's balance
 - ✓ should emit BalanceDecreased event
 - ✓ should emit DonationReceived event

receiveBalanceIncrease

- when called **not** by the bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with no depositors
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should **not** increase depositors' balances
 - ✓ should **not** increase vault's balance
 - ✓ should emit BalanceDecreased event
 - ✓ should emit DonationReceived event

TBTCVault - OptimisticMinting

requestOptimisticMint

- when called **not** by a minter
 - ✓ should revert

- when called by a minter
 - when optimistic minting is paused
 - ✓ should revert
 - when optimistic minting has been already requested
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit has **not** been revealed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit has been revealed
 - when the deposit has been swept
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit is targeted to another vault
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all conditions are met
 - ✓ should request optimistic minting
 - ✓ should emit an event
- finalizeOptimisticMint**
 - when called **not** by a minter
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a minter
 - when optimistic minting is paused
 - ✓ should revert
 - when minting has **not** been requested
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the minting delay has **not** passed yet
 - ✓ should revert
 - when requested minting has been already **finalized**
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the deposit has been already swept
 - ✓ should revert
 - when all conditions are met
 - when fees are non-zero
 - ✓ should send optimistic mint fee to treasury
 - ✓ should mint TBTC to depositor
 - ✓ should incur optimistic mint debt
 - ✓ should mark the request as **finalized**
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when the optimistic minting fee is zero
 - ✓ should send no optimistic mint fee to treasury
 - ✓ should mint TBTC to depositor
 - ✓ should incur optimistic mint debt
 - ✓ should mark the request as **finalized**
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when the **bridge** deposit treasury fee is zero
 - ✓ should send optimistic mint fee to treasury
 - ✓ should mint TBTC to depositor
 - ✓ should incur optimistic mint debt
 - ✓ should mark the request as **finalized**
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when both fees are zero
 - ✓ should mint TBTC to depositor
 - ✓ should incur optimistic mint debt
 - ✓ should mark the request as **finalized**
 - ✓ should emit an event
- cancelOptimisticMint**
 - when called **not** by a guardian
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by a guardian
 - when minting has **not** been requested
 - ✓ should revert
 - when requested minting has been **finalized**
 - ✓ should revert
 - when requested minting has **not** been **finalized**
 - ✓ should cancel optimistic minting
 - ✓ should emit an event
- addMinter**
 - when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the governance
 - when address is **not** a minter
 - ✓ should **add** address as a minter
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when address is a minter

- ✓ should revert
- when there are multiple minters
 - ✓ should **add** them into the list

removeMinter

- when called **not** by the governance **or** a guardian
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - when address is a minter
 - ✓ should take minter role from the address
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when address is **not** a minter
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by a guardian
 - when address is **not** a minter
 - ✓ should revert
 - when address is a minter
 - ✓ should take minter role from the address
 - ✓ should emit an event
- when there are multiple minters
 - when deleting the first minter
 - ✓ should update the minters list
 - when deleting the last minter
 - ✓ should update the minters list
 - when deleting minter from the middle of the list
 - ✓ should update the minters list

addGuardian

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - when address is **not** a guardian
 - ✓ should **add** address as a guardian
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when address is a guardian
 - ✓ should revert

removeGuardian

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - when address is a guardian
 - ✓ should take guardian role from the address
 - ✓ should emit an event
 - when address is **not** a guardian
 - ✓ should revert

pauseOptimisticMinting

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - when optimistic minting is already paused
 - ✓ should revert
 - when optimistic minting is **not** paused
 - ✓ should pause optimistic minting
 - ✓ should emit an event

unpauseOptimisticMinting

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - when optimistic minting is **not** paused
 - ✓ should revert
 - when optimistic minting is paused
 - ✓ should unpause optimistic minting
 - ✓ should emit an event

beginOptimisticMintingFeeUpdate

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the governance
 - ✓ should **not** update the optimistic minting fee
 - ✓ should start the governance delay timer
 - ✓ should emit an event

finalizeOptimisticMintingFeeUpdate

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when the update process is **not** initiated

- ✓ should revert

when the governance delay has **not** passed

- ✓ should revert

when the update process is initiated **and** governance delay passed

- ✓ should update the optimistic minting fee
- ✓ should emit an event
- ✓ should reset the governance delay timer

beginOptimisticMintingDelayUpdate

when called **not** by the governance

- ✓ should revert

when called by the governance

- ✓ should **not** update the optimistic minting delay
- ✓ should start the governance delay timer
- ✓ should emit an event

finalizeOptimisticMintingDelayUpdate

when called **not** by the governance

- ✓ should revert

when the update process is **not** initiated

- ✓ should revert

when the governance delay has **not** passed

- ✓ should revert

when the update process is initiated **and** governance delay passed

- ✓ should update the optimistic minting delay
- ✓ should emit an event
- ✓ should reset the governance delay timer

calculateDepositKey

- ✓ should calculate the key as expected
- ✓ should calculate the same key as the Bridge

receiveBalanceIncrease

when the deposit for which optimistic minting was requested gets swept after **finalization**

- ✓ should repay optimistic minting debt
- ✓ should emit an event

when multiple deposits gets swept after **finalization**

when both deposits were optimistically minted

- ✓ should repay optimistic minting debt
- ✓ should mint the right amount of TBTC to depositor
- ✓ should emit an event

when only one deposit was optimistically minted

- ✓ should repay optimistic minting debt
- ✓ should mint the right amount of TBTC
- ✓ should emit an event

TBTCVault – Redemption

unmintAndRedeem

when the redeemer has no TBTC

- ✓ should revert

when the redeemer has **not** enough TBTC

- ✓ should revert

when there is a single redeemer

- ✓ should transfer balances to Bridge
- ✓ should request redemptions in Bridge
- ✓ should burn TBTC
- ✓ should emit Unminted events

when amount is **not** fully convertible to satoshis

- ✓ should transfer balances to Bridge
- ✓ should request redemptions in Bridge
- ✓ should burn TBTC
- ✓ should emit Unminted events

when there are multiple redeemers

BigNumber { value: "10000000000000000000" }

BigNumber { value: "10000000000000000000" }

- ✓ should transfer balances to Bridge
- ✓ should request redemptions in Bridge
- ✓ should burn TBTC
- ✓ should emit Unminted events

receiveApproval

when called via approveAndCall

when called with non-empty extraData

when there is a single redeemer

- ✓ should transfer balances to Bridge
- ✓ should request redemptions in Bridge
- ✓ should burn TBTC

- ✓ should emit Unminted events
- when there are multiple redeemers
 - ✓ should transfer balances to Bridge
 - ✓ should request redemptions in Bridge
 - ✓ should burn TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Unminted events

TBTCVault

constructor

- when called with a 0-address bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with a 0-address TBTC token
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with a 0-address **bridge**
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should set the Bank field
 - ✓ should set the TBTC token field

recoverERC20FromToken

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should do a successful recovery

recoverERC721FromToken

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should do a successful recovery

recoverERC20

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should do a successful recovery

recoverERC721

- when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
- when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should do a successful recovery

mint

- when minter has **not** enough balance in the bank
 - ✓ should revert
- when there is a single minter
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the vault
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
- when amount is **not** fully convertible to satoshis
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the vault
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
- when there are multiple minters
 - ✓ should transfer balances to the vault
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted event

unmint

- when the unminter has no TBTC
 - ✓ should revert
- when the unminter has **not** enough TBTC
 - ✓ should revert
- when there is a single unminter
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the unminter
 - ✓ should burn TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Unminted events
- when amount is **not** fully convertible to satoshis
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the unminter
 - ✓ should burn TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Unminted events
- when there are multiple unminters
 - ✓ should transfer balances to unminters
 - ✓ should burn TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Unminted events

receiveApproval

- when called **not** for TBTC token

- ✓ should revert
- when called directly
 - ✓ should revert
- when called via approveAndCall
 - when called with an empty extraData
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the unminter
 - ✓ should burn TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Unminted event
 - when amount is **not** fully convertible to satoshis
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the unminter
 - ✓ should burn TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Unminted events
- receiveBalanceApproval
 - when called **not** by the bank
 - ✓ should revert
 - when caller has **not** enough balance in the bank
 - ✓ should revert
 - when there is a single caller
 - ✓ should transfer balance to the vault
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
 - when there are multiple callers
 - ✓ should transfer balances to the vault
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
- receiveBalanceIncrease
 - when called **not** by the bank
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called with no depositors
 - ✓ should revert
 - with single depositor
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted event
 - with multiple depositors
 - ✓ should mint TBTC
 - ✓ should emit Minted events
- initiateUpgrade
 - when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the governance
 - when called with a zero-address **new** vault
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called with a non-zero-address **new** vault
 - ✓ should **not** transfer TBTC token ownership
 - ✓ should set the upgrade initiation time
 - ✓ should set the **new** vault address
 - ✓ should emit UpgradeInitiated event
- finalizeUpgrade**
 - when called **not** by the governance
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the governance
 - when the upgrade process has **not** been initiated
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the upgrade process has been initiated
 - when the governance delay has **not** passed
 - ✓ should revert
 - when the governance delay passed
 - ✓ should transfer TBTC token ownership
 - ✓ should transfer the entire bank balance
 - ✓ should emit UpgradeFinalized event
 - ✓ should reset the upgrade initiation time
 - ✓ should reset the **new** vault address
- amountToSatoshis
 - when the amount is convertible with a remainder
 - ✓ should calculate correct convertible amount
 - ✓ should calculate correct remainder
 - ✓ should calculate correct satoshi amount
 - when the amount is convertible without a remainder
 - ✓ should calculate correct convertible amount
 - ✓ should calculate correct remainder
 - ✓ should calculate correct satoshi amount

2190 passing (3m)
27 pending

Integration tests for 'keep-network/tbtc-v2'

Integration Test - Full flow

transferred 4500000000 T to the VendingMachine for KEEP

transferred 4500000000 T to the VendingMachine for NU

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of WalletRegistry

You are using the `unsafeAllow.external-library-linking` flag to include external libraries.
Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

Warning: Potentially unsafe deployment of BridgeStub

You are using the `unsafeAllow.external-library-linking` flag to include external libraries.
Make sure you have manually checked that the linked libraries are upgrade safe.

Initialized Wallet Owner address: 0x3c705dB336C81c7FEFC5746e283aB2c0781A4B7b in transaction:
0x4c54557085513b45258fe2a2f2b11d7b8abe6f870942f0d513209c4d26df7624

Check deposit and redemption flow

when wallet is created

when a deposit is revealed

✓ should create a deposit

when the deposit sweep proof is submitted

✓ should mint TBTC tokens for the depositor

✓ should increase the balance of vault in the bank

✓ should update the main UTXO of the wallet

when a redemption is requested

✓ should create a pending redemption request

✓ should increase the pending redemptions value of the wallet

✓ should increase the balance of **bridge** in the bank

when the redemption proof is submitted

✓ should zero the pending redemptions value of the wallet

✓ should zero the balance of **bridge** in the bank

✓ should update the main UTXO of the wallet

Integration Test - Slashing

notifyFraudChallengeDefeatTimeout

when wallet is created

when a fraud is reported

✓ should slash wallet members

✓ should close the wallet in the wallet registry

✓ should terminate the wallet in the **bridge**

✓ should consume around 3 100 000 gas for Bridge.notifyMovingFundsTimeoutTx transaction

notifyRedemptionTimeout

when wallet is created

when a redemption timeout is reported

✓ should slash wallet members

✓ should **not** close the wallet in the wallet registry

✓ should transition the wallet in the **bridge** to the MovingFunds state

✓ should consume around 3 150 000 gas for Bridge.notifyRedemptionTimeout transaction

notifyMovingFundsTimeout

when wallet is created

when moving funds timeout is reported

✓ should slash wallet members

✓ should close the wallet in the wallet registry

✓ should terminate the wallet in the **bridge**

✓ should consume around 3 100 000 gas for Bridge.notifyMovingFundsTimeoutTx transaction

Integration Test - Wallet Creation

new wallet creation (happy path)

✓ should register a **new** wallet in the WalletRegistry

✓ should register a **new** wallet details in the Bridge

✓ should register a **new** wallet as active in the Bridge

✓ should consume around 94 000 gas for Bridge.requestNewWallet transaction

✓ should consume around 341 000 gas for WalletRegistry.approveDkgResult transaction

27 passing (1m)

Tests for 'thesis/mezo-portal'

BitcoinDepositor

initialize

when called directly on the implementation

- ✓ should revert

when called on the proxy

when called again

- ✓ should revert (78ms)

when called with zero-address **bridge**

- ✓ should revert

when called with zero-address tBTC vault

- ✓ should revert

when called with zero-address tBTC token

- ✓ should revert

when called with zero-address portal

- ✓ should revert

initializeDeposit

when the deposit owner is zero address

- ✓ should revert

when the deposit was already initialized

- ✓ should revert

when initializing for the first time

- ✓ should set the deposit state to Initialized
- ✓ should emit DepositInitialized event

finalizeDeposit

when the deposit was **not** initialized before

- ✓ should revert

when the deposit was **not** finalized by the **bridge**

- ✓ should revert

when deposit was **finalized** by the **bridge**

when a single, non-lockable deposit was **finalized**

when deposit owner param is different than during the initialization

- ✓ should revert

when deposit lock period param is different than during the initialization

- ✓ should revert

when called with the same params as during the initialization

- ✓ should emit DepositFinalized event
- ✓ should set the deposit state to Finalized
- ✓ should deposit tokens to the Portal contract (59ms)
- ✓ should keep the surplus in the BitcoinDepositor contract

when a single, lockable deposit was **finalized**

when deposit owner param is different than during the initialization

- ✓ should revert

when deposit lock period param is different than during the initialization

- ✓ should revert

when called with the same params as during the initialization

- ✓ should emit DepositFinalized event
- ✓ should set the deposit state to Finalized
- ✓ should deposit tokens to the Portal contract
- ✓ should keep the surplus in the BitcoinDepositor contract

when multiple deposits were **finalized**

when called with the same params as during the initialization

- ✓ should set the states of deposits to Finalized
- ✓ should deposit tokens to the Portal contract
- ✓ should keep the surplus in the BitcoinDepositor contract

when called for the same deposit second time

when called with the same params

- ✓ should revert

when called with different params

- ✓ should revert

Portal – deposit method

deposit

when called incorrectly

when depositing without locking

when depositing 0-address token

- ✓ should revert

when depositing unsupported token

- ✓ should revert

when depositing 0 amount

- ✓ should revert

when depositing with locking

when token is **not** supported

- ✓ should revert
- when token is `not` lockable
 - ✓ should revert
- when lock time is less than 1 week
 - ✓ should revert
- when lock time is less than min lock time
 - ✓ should revert
- when lock time is greater than max lock time
 - ✓ should revert
- when lock time is `not` a multiple of a week
 - ✓ should round the lock period to the nearest week
- when called correctly
 - when depositing without locking
 - when depositing already supported token
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should update the balance of the depositor
 - ✓ should set unlock time to current block
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the contract
 - when depositing newly added supported token
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should update the balance of the depositor
 - ✓ should set unlock time to current block
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the contract
 - when depositing with locking
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should emit a Locked event
 - ✓ should set unlock time correctly

Portal – depositFor method

depositFor

- when called incorrectly
 - when depositing without locking
 - when depositing `0`-address token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when depositing unsupported token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when depositing with `0`-address deposit owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when depositing `0` amount
 - ✓ should revert
 - when depositing with locking
 - when token is `not` supported
 - ✓ should revert
 - when token is `not` lockable
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock time is less than 1 week
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock time is less than min lock time
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock time is greater than max lock time
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock time is `not` a multiple of a week
 - ✓ should round the lock period to the nearest week
- when called correctly
 - when depositing without locking
 - when depositing for someone else
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should update the balance of the depositor
 - ✓ should set unlock time to current block
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the contract
 - when depositing for oneself
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should update the balance of the depositor
 - ✓ should set unlock time to current block
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the contract
 - when depositing with locking
 - when depositing with locking for someone else
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should emit a Locked event
 - ✓ should set unlock time correctly
 - when depositing with locking for oneself
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event

- ✓ should emit a Locked event
- ✓ should set unlock time correctly

Portal – lock method

lock

- when called incorrectly
 - when the deposit doesn't exist
 - ✓ should revert
 - when token can't be locked
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock period is less than 1 week
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock period is less than min lock period
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock period is more than max lock period
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock period is less than current lock period
 - ✓ should revert
- when called correctly
 - when locking deposit for the first time
 - ✓ should emit a Locked event
 - ✓ should set unlock time correctly
 - when extending lock period
 - ✓ should emit a Locked event
 - ✓ should set unlock time correctly
 - when locking deposit after lock period has expired
 - ✓ should emit a Locked event
 - ✓ should set unlock time correctly

Portal – receiveApproval method

receiveApproval

- when called incorrectly
 - when depositing without locking
 - when receiving unsupported token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called directly
 - ✓ should revert
 - when receiving empty lock period data
 - ✓ should revert
 - when depositing amount exceeding uint96
 - ✓ should revert
- when depositing with locking
 - when it's trying to lock `not` lockable token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when it's trying to lock without lock period
 - ✓ should revert
 - when it's trying to lock with lock period less than min lock period
 - ✓ should revert
 - when it's trying to lock with lock period exceeding max lock period
 - ✓ should revert
 - when it's trying to lock with lock period of 1 day
 - ✓ should revert
- when called correctly
 - when depositing without locking
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should update the balance of the depositor
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the contract
 - when depositing with locking
 - ✓ should emit a Deposited event
 - ✓ should emit a Locked event
 - ✓ should set unlock time correctly

Portal – deployment `and` governance

deployment

- when deployed with `0`-address token
 - ✓ should revert
- when deployed with supported tokens
 - ✓ should deploy with 1 supported token
 - ✓ should deploy with `>1` supported tokens

addSupportedToken

- when called by non-owner
 - ✓ should revert

when called by owner incorrectly

when adding 0-address token

✓ should revert

when adding already supported token

✓ should revert

when called by owner correctly

✓ should emit a SupportedTokenAdded event

✓ should update the supported tokens

setMinLockPeriod

when called by non-owner

✓ should revert

when called by owner

when called incorrectly

when trying to set min lock period greater than max lock period

✓ should revert

when trying to set min lock period **not** normalized

✓ should revert

when trying to set min lock period to value giving 0 post-normalization

✓ should revert

when trying to set min lock period to 0

✓ should revert

when called correctly

✓ should emit a MinLockPeriodUpdated event

✓ should update the min lock period

setMaxLockPeriod

when called by non-owner

✓ should revert

when called by owner

when called incorrectly

when trying to set max lock period less than min lock period

✓ should revert

when trying to set max lock period **not** normalized

✓ should revert

when called correctly

✓ should emit a MaxLockPeriodUpdated event

✓ should update the max lock period

Portal – contract upgrades

when upgrading to an invalid contract

when a variable was added before old variables

✓ should **throw** an error

when a variable was removed

✓ should **throw** an error

when upgrading to a valid contract

✓ **new** instance should have the same address as the old one

contract variables

✓ should initialize **new** variable

✓ should **add** new supported tokens

✓ should keep old supported tokens

✓ should keep old supported tokens' balances

contract functions

✓ should **execute** the **new** code

✓ should have access to storage slots from the previous version

✓ should be able to update storage slots

Portal – withdraw method

withdraw

when withdrawing incorrectly

when token is **not** supported

✓ should revert

when amount deposited is 0

✓ should revert

when amount to withdraw is 0

✓ should revert

when amount is greater than deposited balance

✓ should revert

when deposit is **not** locked

when the token being withdrawn is **not** lockable

✓ should emit Withdrawn event

✓ should decrease the deposited balance

✓ should transfer the token to the user

✓ should allow to withdraw the remaining balance later

- when the token being withdrawn is lockable
 - ✓ should emit Withdrawn event
 - ✓ should decrease the deposited balance
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the user
 - ✓ should allow to withdraw the remaining balance later
- when deposit is locked
 - when the token being withdrawn is lockable
 - when lock time has **not** passed
 - when trying to withdraw lockable token
 - ✓ should revert
 - when lock time has passed
 - ✓ should emit Withdrawn event
 - ✓ should decrease the deposited balance
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the user
 - ✓ should allow to withdraw the remaining balance later
- when withdrawing funds deposited by someone else
 - when called by the deposit funder
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called by the deposit owner
 - ✓ should emit Withdrawn event
 - ✓ should transfer the token to the deposit owner

Integration tests – Depositing

- when no token was deposited yet
 - ✓ should have depositCount equal to 0
 - ✓ should have no tokens deposited
- when depositing tokens
 - ✓ should update depositCount
 - ✓ should update token balances
 - ✓ should update saved deposits details
- when locking existing deposits
 - ✓ should **not** change depositCount
 - ✓ should **not** change token balances
 - ✓ should update saved deposits details
- when depositing tokens with a lock
 - ✓ should update depositCount
 - ✓ should update token balances
 - ✓ should update saved deposits details
- when extending the lock of existing deposits
 - ✓ should **not** change depositCount
 - ✓ should **not** change token balances
 - ✓ should update saved deposits details
- when withdrawing deposits
 - ✓ should **not** change depositCount
 - ✓ should update token balances
 - ✓ should update saved deposits details
- when depositing tokens again
 - ✓ should update depositCount
 - ✓ should update token balances
 - ✓ should update saved deposits details

Integration tests – Lock Period

- when updating allowed lock period range
 - when minimum lock period is increased
 - ✓ should allow to use **new** minimum lock period for **new** deposits
 - ✓ should allow to extend the lock of the existing deposits
 - when minimum lock period is decreased
 - ✓ should allow to use **new** minimum lock period for **new** deposits
 - ✓ should **not** allow to decrease the lock period of the existing deposits
- when maximum lock period is increased
 - ✓ should allow to use **new** maximum lock period for **new** deposits
 - ✓ should allow to extend the lock of the existing deposits
- when maximum lock period is decreased
 - ✓ should allow to use **new** maximum lock period for **new** deposits
 - ✓ should **not** allow to decrease the lock period of the existing deposits

Integration tests – Supported Tokens

- when updating supported tokens
 - when **new** token can only be deposited
 - ✓ should make a deposit of the **new** token
 - ✓ should **not** lock the deposit of the **new** token
 - ✓ should withdraw the deposit of the **new** token

- when **new** token can be deposited **and** locked
 - ✓ should make a deposit of the **new** token
 - ✓ should allow to lock the deposit of the **new** token later
 - ✓ should make a deposit of the **new** token with a lock
 - ✓ should extend the lock the deposit of the **new** token
 - ✓ should withdraw the deposits of the **new** token after lock period

186 passing (4s)

Tests for 'thesis/orangekit'

BitcoinSafeOwner

using test harness

constructor

- ✓ should set initialized property

setup

when contract is initialized

- ✓ should revert with ContractAlreadyInitialized

when contract is **not** initialized

when truncatedBitcoinAddress is zero

- ✓ should revert with InvalidTruncatedBitcoinAddress

when emergencyGovernance address is zero

- ✓ should revert with EmergencyGovernanceAddressZero

when parameters are valid

- ✓ should set truncatedBitcoinAddress

- ✓ should set emergencyGovernance address

isValidSignature(bytes,bytes)

when truncatedBitcoinAddress is **not** set

- ✓ should revert with InvalidTruncatedBitcoinAddress

isValidSignature(bytes32,bytes)

when truncatedBitcoinAddress is **not** set

- ✓ should revert with InvalidTruncatedBitcoinAddress

encodeDigest

- ✓ should encode the digest properly (98ms)

shouldEncodeDigest

when the highest v bit is **not** set

- ✓ should **not** decode (66ms)

when the highest v bit is set

- ✓ should decode (65ms)

when contract is deployed by the OrangeKitSafeFactory

setup

- ✓ should set truncatedBitcoinAddress

- ✓ should set emergencyGovernance address

when called again

- ✓ should revert with ContractAlreadyInitialized

isValidSignature(bytes,bytes)

when signature is valid

- ✓ should **return** 0x20c13b0b

when signature is valid (encoded digest mode)

- ✓ should **return** 0x20c13b0b for vector 1 (89ms)

- ✓ should **return** 0x20c13b0b for vector 2 (101ms)

- ✓ should **return** 0x20c13b0b for vector 3 (89ms)

- ✓ should **return** 0x20c13b0b for vector 4 (95ms)

- ✓ should **return** 0x20c13b0b for vector 5 (135ms)

when signature is invalid

- ✓ should **return** 0xffffffff

when signature is too short

- ✓ should revert with InvalidSignatureLength

when signature is too **long**

- ✓ should revert with InvalidSignatureLength

when **public** key is **not** on the curve

- ✓ should revert with PubkeyNotOnCurve (39ms)

when s is in the upper range

- ✓ should revert with InvalidSignatureS (40ms)

isValidSignature(bytes32,bytes)

when signature is valid

- ✓ should **return** 0x1626ba7e

when signature is valid (encoded digest mode)

- ✓ should **return** 0x1626ba7e for vector 1 (95ms)

- ✓ should **return** 0x1626ba7e for vector 2 (83ms)

- ✓ should **return** 0x1626ba7e for vector 3 (92ms)

- ✓ should return 0x1626ba7e for vector 4 (102ms)
- ✓ should return 0x1626ba7e for vector 5 (87ms)

when signature is invalid

- ✓ should return 0xffffffff

when signature is too short

- ✓ should revert with InvalidSignatureLength

when signature is too long

- ✓ should revert with InvalidSignatureLength

compatibility tests with OrangeKitSafeFactory

uncompressed P2PKH

when the v offset is valid

- ✓ should return 0x20c13b0b with offset 0

when the v offset is incompatible

- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 4
- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 8
- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 12

when the v offset is unsupported

- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 2
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 6
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 10
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 14

compressed P2PKH

when the v offset is valid

- ✓ should return 0x20c13b0b with offset 4

when the v offset is incompatible

- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 0
- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 8 (49ms)

when the v offset is unsupported

- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 2 (170ms)
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 6 (43ms)
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 10
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 14

P2SH_P2WPKH

when the v offset is valid

- ✓ should return 0x20c13b0b with offset 8

when the v offset is incompatible

- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 0
- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 4
- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 12

when the v offset is unsupported

- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 2
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 6
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 10
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 14

P2WPKH

when the v offset is valid

- ✓ should return 0x20c13b0b with offset 12

when the v offset is incompatible

- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 0
- ✓ should return 0xffffffff on offset 8

when the v offset is unsupported

- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 2
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 6
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 10
- ✓ should throw InvalidSignatureV on offset 14

BitcoinSafeOwner – Upgrade

DOMAIN_SEPARATOR

- ✓ should be keccak256 of EIP712 domain struct

UPGRADE_SINGLETON_TYPEHASH

- ✓ should be keccak256 of the UpgradeSingleton message

upgradeSingleton

when upgrading to zero address

- ✓ should revert

when upgrading to the same address

- ✓ should revert

when the upgrade signature is incorrect

- ✓ should revert

when the upgrade signature is correct

when init data are empty

- ✓ should revert (49ms)

when init data are not empty

- ✓ should upgrade the singleton address

- ✓ should emit SingletonUpgraded event
- ✓ should call the setup function
- ✓ should remain functional

when init data are **not** empty **and** initialization failed

- ✓ should revert (64ms)

when trying to use the same upgrade signature again

- ✓ should revert

emergencyUpgradeSingleton

when called by a third party

- ✓ should revert

when called by the emergency upgrader

when upgrading to zero address

- ✓ should revert

when upgrading to the same address

- ✓ should revert

when called after the emergency upgrades were disabled

- ✓ should revert

when called while emergency upgrades are enabled

when init data are empty

- ✓ should revert

when init data are **not** empty

- ✓ should upgrade the singleton address
- ✓ should emit SingletonUpgraded event
- ✓ should call the setup function
- ✓ should remain functional

EmergencyGovernance

emergencyUpgrader

when emergency upgrades are enabled

- ✓ should **return** the upgrader address

when emergency upgrades are disabled

- ✓ should revert

disable

when called by a third party

- ✓ should revert

when called by the contract owner

- ✓ should disable emergency upgrades
- ✓ should emit an event

when called by the contract owner one more time

- ✓ should revert

setEmergencyUpgrader

when called by a third party

- ✓ should revert

when called by the contract owner

when emergency upgrades are disabled

- ✓ should revert

when emergency upgrades are enabled

- ✓ should replace the emergency upgrader
- ✓ should emit EmergencyUpgraderChanged event

OrangeKitDeployer

deployEmergencyGovernance

- ✓ should set the address **and** emit event
- ✓ should deploy the EmergencyGovernance contract

deployBitcoinSafeOwnerSingleton

- ✓ should set the address **and** emit event
- ✓ should deploy the BitcoinSafeOwner singleton contract

deployOrangeKitSafeFactorySingleton

- ✓ should set the address **and** emit event
- ✓ should deploy the OrangeKitSafeFactory singleton contract

deployOrangeKitSafeFactoryProxy

when EmergencyGovernance is **not** deployed

- ✓ should revert

when BitcoinSafeOwner singleton is **not** deployed

- ✓ should revert

when OrangeKitSafeFactory singleton is **not** deployed

- ✓ should revert

when all other contracts are deployed

- ✓ should set the address **and** emit event
- ✓ should deploy the OrangeKitSafeFactory proxy contract
- ✓ should initialize the deployed OrangeKitSafeFactory proxy contract
- ✓ should transfer the ownership of the OrangeKitSafeFactory proxy contract

deploy

- ✓ should set all addresses **and** emit events

- ✓ should deploy all contracts (43ms)
- ✓ should initialize the deployed OrangeKitSafeFactory proxy contract
- ✓ should transfer the ownership of the OrangeKitSafeFactory proxy contract

OrangeKitSafeFactory

initialize

- when called on initialized contract
 - ✓ should revert
- when called on uninitialized contract
 - when safe singleton is zero address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when safe owner singleton is zero address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when emergency governance is zero address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when safe singleton is EOA
 - ✓ should revert
 - when safe owner singleton is EOA
 - ✓ should revert
 - when emergency governance is EOA
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called with correct parameters
 - ✓ should deploy contract and set parameters correctly

deploySafe

- when called with a zero address bitcoin owner
 - ✓ should revert
- when called for the same owner more than once
 - ✓ should revert
- when called once
 - ✓ should set BitcoinSafeOwner as the only BitcoinSafe owner
 - ✓ should set bitcoin signer ethereum address in the BitcoinSafeOwner contract
 - ✓ should set emergency governance in the BitcoinSafeOwner contract
 - ✓ should emit the SafeDeployed event
- when called for the same owner at different order
 - ✓ should yield the same addresses (1486ms)

predictAddresses

- for one bitcoin signer
 - ✓ should predict correct addresses (42ms)
- for multiple bitcoin signers
 - ✓ should predict correct addresses for bitcoin signer 1
 - ✓ should predict correct addresses for bitcoin signer 2
 - ✓ should predict different addresses for two signers

transferOwnership

- when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when called with zero address new owner
 - ✓ should revert
 - when called with non-zero new owner address
 - ✓ should transfer the ownership
 - ✓ should emit OwnershipTransferred event

upgradeSingleton

- when called by a third party
 - ✓ should revert
- when called by the owner
 - when upgrading to zero address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when upgrading to the same address
 - ✓ should revert
 - when init data are empty
 - ✓ should revert
 - when init data are not empty
 - ✓ should upgrade the singleton address
 - ✓ should emit SingletonUpgraded event
 - ✓ should call the initialize function
 - ✓ should remain functional

OrangeKitSafeFactory – contract upgrades

- when upgrading to a valid contract
 - when singletons remain the same
 - contract variables
 - ✓ should initialize new variable
 - ✓ should keep old singletons addresses
- predictAddresses

- ✓ should predict correct addresses for bitcoin signer 1
- ✓ should predict correct addresses for bitcoin signer 2

deploySafe

- for safe that has `not` been deployed in V1
 - ✓ should deploy with addresses predicted in V1
- for safe that was already deployed in V1
 - ✓ should revert

Safe with Bitcoin Owner

deploy safe `and` test transaction signing

uncompressed P2PKH address

safe deployment

- ✓ should set `BitcoinSafeOwner` as the only `BitcoinSafe` owner
- ✓ should set `truncatedBitcoinAddress` in the `BitcoinSafeOwner` contract

token transfer execution in the safe

- ✓ should emit `ExecutionSuccess` event
- ✓ should transfer tokens from safe to destination

compressed P2PKH address

safe deployment

- ✓ should set `BitcoinSafeOwner` as the only `BitcoinSafe` owner
- ✓ should set `truncatedBitcoinAddress` in the `BitcoinSafeOwner` contract

token transfer execution in the safe

- ✓ should emit `ExecutionSuccess` event
- ✓ should transfer tokens from safe to destination

P2SH.P2WPKH address

safe deployment

- ✓ should set `BitcoinSafeOwner` as the only `BitcoinSafe` owner
- ✓ should set `truncatedBitcoinAddress` in the `BitcoinSafeOwner` contract

token transfer execution in the safe

- ✓ should emit `ExecutionSuccess` event
- ✓ should transfer tokens from safe to destination

P2WPKH address

safe deployment

- ✓ should set `BitcoinSafeOwner` as the only `BitcoinSafe` owner
- ✓ should set `truncatedBitcoinAddress` in the `BitcoinSafeOwner` contract

token transfer execution in the safe

- ✓ should emit `ExecutionSuccess` event
- ✓ should transfer tokens from safe to destination

bitcoinSafeOwner helpers

recoverTruncatedBitcoinAddressFromBase58

- ✓ should recover the correct data from a uncompressed P2PKH address
- ✓ should recover the correct data from a compressed P2PKH address
- ✓ should recover the correct data from a P2SH.P2WPKH address

recoverTruncatedBitcoinAddressFromBech32

- ✓ should recover the correct data from a P2WPKH address

169 passing (13s)

Code Coverage

Update: The coverage situation remains largely the same.

Coverage appears to be decent for code in scope in `keep-network/tbtc-v2` and `thesis/mezo-portal`. However, it looks like there are two `revert` statements that are not being tested at the following locations:

1. `Portal.sol#L162`
2. `BitcoinDepositor.sol#L198`

Coverage for `keep-network/tbtc-v2`

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|------------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| contracts/ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| GovernanceUtils.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 36,37,38,40 |
| contracts/bank/ | 97.87 | 93.75 | 100 | 98.33 | |
| Bank.sol | 97.87 | 93.75 | 100 | 98.33 | 380 |

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|---|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| IReceiveBalanceApproval.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/bridge/ | 2.83 | 1.75 | 1.21 | 2.24 | |
| BitcoinTx.sol | 54.05 | 27.78 | 40 | 55 | ... 352,371,373 |
| Bridge.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 1,1966,1991 |
| BridgeGovernance.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 2,1767,1783 |
| BridgeGovernanceParameters.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 9,1571,1572 |
| BridgeState.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 852,857,858 |
| Deposit.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 420,427,435 |
| DepositSweep.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 569,572,574 |
| EcdsaLib.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| Fraud.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 576,577,578 |
| Heartbeat.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| IRelay.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| MovingFunds.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 8,1069,1072 |
| Redemption.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 6,1191,1193 |
| RedemptionWatchtower.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 618,620,621 |
| VendingMachine.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 309,310,311 |
| VendingMachineV2.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 109,110,112 |
| VendingMachineV3.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 129,130,132 |
| WalletProposalValidator.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 877,893,898 |
| Wallets.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 706,717,720 |
| contracts/hardhat-dependency-compiler/@keep-network/ecdsa/contracts/ | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| WalletRegistry.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/hardhat-dependency-compiler/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/ | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|---------------------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|--------------------|
| ProxyAdmin.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/integrator/ | 100 | 87.5 | 100 | 100 | |
| AbstractTBTCDepositor.sol | 100 | 87.5 | 100 | 100 | |
| IBridge.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| ITBTCVault.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/I2/ | 50.38 | 46.53 | 59.09 | 48.6 | |
| L1BitcoinDepositor.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ...
634,636,651 |
| L2BitcoinDepositor.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 175,181,186 |
| L2TBTC.sol | 100 | 97.62 | 100 | 100 | |
| L2WormholeGateway.sol | 100 | 81.25 | 100 | 100 | |
| Wormhole.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/maintainer/ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| MaintainerProxy.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ...
536,553,558 |
| contracts/relay/ | 82.93 | 68.37 | 66.67 | 80.31 | |
| LightRelay.sol | 100 | 90.54 | 100 | 98.08 | 438,439 |
| LightRelayMaintainerProxy.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 138,140,142 |
| contracts/test/ | 65 | 33.33 | 56.9 | 56.36 | |
| BankStub.sol | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| BridgeStub.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 158,166,172 |
| HeartbeatStub.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| LightRelayStub.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| ReceiveApprovalStub.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23,24,27,31 |
| SepoliaLightRelay.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41,45,46 |
| SystemTestRelay.sol | 75 | 100 | 50 | 50 | 18,22,38,42 |
| TestBitcoinTx.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| TestERC20.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|---------------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| TestERC721.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| TestEcdsaLib.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| TestTBTCDepositor.sol | 95.65 | 57.14 | 88.24 | 95.24 | 163,225 |
| WormholeBridgeStub.sol | 90 | 100 | 87.5 | 92.31 | 123 |
| contracts/token/ | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| TBTC.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/vault/ | 24.17 | 15 | 24.44 | 22.09 | |
| DonationVault.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| IVault.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| TBTCOptimisticMinting.sol | 6.35 | 2.27 | 9.09 | 5.38 | ... 560,561,562 |
| TBTCVault.sol | 23.81 | 13.16 | 22.22 | 25 | ... 343,344,345 |
| All files | 19.52 | 16.64 | 21.12 | 18.44 | |

Coverage for `thesis/mezo-portal`

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|----------------------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| contracts/ | 100 | 93.59 | 100 | 98.23 | |
| BitcoinDepositor.sol | 100 | 92.86 | 100 | 95.45 | 198 |
| Portal.sol | 100 | 93.75 | 100 | 98.9 | 162 |
| contracts/interfaces/ | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| IApproveAndCall.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| IReceiveApproval.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/tests/ | 90.91 | 50 | 100 | 92.31 | |
| MockERC20.sol | 83.33 | 50 | 100 | 83.33 | 36 |
| MockTBTC.sol | 100 | 50 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/tests/upgrades/ | 10.53 | 3.85 | 13.95 | 8.33 | |
| PortalV2.sol | 31.03 | 10.61 | 40 | 24.72 | ... 498,506,516 |
| PortalV2MisplacedSlot.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 482,490,500 |
| PortalV2MissingSlot.sol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ... 478,486,496 |

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|-----------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| All files | 39.61 | 31.2 | 43.94 | 37.18 | |

Coverage for thesis/orangekit

| File | % Stmts | % Branch | % Funcs | % Lines | Uncovered Lines |
|-----------------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| contracts/ | 99.18 | 91.96 | 97.92 | 96.37 | |
| BitcoinSafeOwner.sol | 100 | 93.1 | 100 | 96.7 | 172,190,219 |
| ERC1271.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| EmergencyGovernance.sol | 100 | 92.86 | 100 | 91.67 | 64 |
| LegacyERC1271.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| OrangeKitDeployer.sol | 100 | 87.5 | 100 | 96 | 164 |
| OrangeKitSafeFactory.sol | 96.88 | 93.33 | 93.33 | 96.77 | 100,175 |
| Proxy.sol | 100 | 50 | 100 | 100 | |
| contracts/test/ | 27 | 12.5 | 45 | 31.54 | |
| BitcoinSafeOwnerHarness.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| BitcoinSafeOwnerV2.sol | 7.58 | 8.93 | 16.67 | 12.36 | ... 574,576,591 |
| OrangeKitSafeFactoryV2.sol | 58.62 | 20.83 | 56.25 | 56.36 | ... 407,409,412 |
| TestERC20.sol | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| All files | 66.67 | 58.85 | 73.86 | 68.13 | |

Changelog

- 2024-05-03 - Initial report
- 2024-05-24 - Final report

About Quantstamp

Quantstamp is a global leader in blockchain security. Founded in 2017, Quantstamp's mission is to securely onboard the next billion users to Web3 through its best-in-class Web3 security products and services.

Quantstamp's team consists of cybersecurity experts hailing from globally recognized organizations including Microsoft, AWS, BMW, Meta, and the Ethereum Foundation. Quantstamp engineers hold PhDs or advanced computer science degrees, with decades of combined experience in formal verification, static analysis, blockchain audits, penetration testing, and original leading-edge research.

To date, Quantstamp has performed more than 500 audits and secured over \$200 billion in digital asset risk from hackers. Quantstamp has worked with a diverse range of customers, including startups, category leaders and financial institutions. Brands that Quantstamp has worked with include Ethereum 2.0, Binance, Visa, PayPal, Polygon, Avalanche, Curve, Solana, Compound, Lido, MakerDAO, Arbitrum, OpenSea and the World Economic Forum.

Quantstamp's collaborations and partnerships showcase our commitment to world-class research, development and security. We're honored to work with some of the top names in the industry and proud to secure the future of web3.

Notable Collaborations & Customers:

- Blockchains: Ethereum 2.0, Near, Flow, Avalanche, Solana, Cardano, Binance Smart Chain, Hedera Hashgraph, Tezos
- DeFi: Curve, Compound, Maker, Lido, Polygon, Arbitrum, SushiSwap
- NFT: OpenSea, Parallel, Dapper Labs, Decentraland, Sandbox, Axie Infinity, Illuvium, NBA Top Shot, Zora
- Academic institutions: National University of Singapore, MIT

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